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INTRODUCTION
Since I began studying applied ethics roughly eight years ago, I have thought a lot about
animals. I remember reading Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation as an undergraduate student and
Tom Regan’s lengthy The Case for Animal Rights in graduate school. These two thinkers were
personally very influential in my lifestyle habits. By force of their arguments, I, after dragging
my feet in hesitation, became a vegetarian. Since my years as an undergraduate, I’ve been
leaning towards a lifestyle shift to veganism, but am again, dragging my feet. Their arguments
are powerful, and have drastically changed the moral atmosphere of eating meat not only in the
realm of academia, but also greatly in the public sphere.
This last summer, for internship credit, I briefly worked shadowing and helping animal
caretakers at an animal rescue sanctuary in the Pacific Northwest. When I arrived, I was asked by
the organization whether I wanted to work with the dogs and cats, or with the farm animals. I
was familiar with dogs and cats, but as I grew up in an urban environment, I had no real
exposure to farm animals. So I asked to work with the farm animal caretakers, specifically, to get
an experience of something completely new. On farm duty, I learned a lot about the diverse
temperaments and personalities of many different species. The cows couldn’t care less about me;
the potbellied pigs wanted two things: food, and your affection; the sheep were sheepish and
wouldn’t come near me; the roosters were (for the most part) musically inclined—one poor guy
sounded so terribly out of tune with the others that it was hard not to laugh when he vocalized;
the llamas and goats were curious investigators; the ponies were sassy; and the horses were
patient and kind. When I was on the farm, I began to observe the particular relationships that the
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caretakers had with each different animal. Surprisingly Singer and Regan’s ethics did not really
surface in my experience with the animals. What seemed foundational between the caregivers
and the animals was something more emotional. The caretakers and the organization seemed to
be working out of some cross-species understanding of compassion, empathy, and love for each
particular animal.
At the sanctuary, the caretakers had a detailed understanding of each animal’s personal
story. Each animal had a narrative with a dark past. These animals had been ‘rescued’ for a
reason—usually due to neglect or physical abuse by humans. The narrative that most stood out to
me was the story of Rebel, the horse. Before my arrival at the sanctuary, Rebel was surrendered
to the sanctuary by his owner. When I met him, Rebel was recovering from surgery. He needed
surgery to remove an eight pound tumor that had grown on his sheath. Rebel was surrendered by
his owner because the owner could not afford to pay for the medical care necessary to remove it.
It seemed that Rebel’s situation was a result of inattention and neglect by his ‘owner.’ As the
caretakers at the sanctuary told me, tumors simply do not grow to eight pounds overnight! Soon
after the organization had taken Rebel in, they paid for the surgery needed to remove the tumor.
The hope was that Rebel would recover following the tumor’s removal. Unfortunately, the
cancer was more aggressive than the veterinarian and the sanctuary had thought, and another
tumor began to grow in the former one’s stead. It was then that the organization knew that not
much more could be done except to manage Rebel’s pain.
Managing Rebel’s pain—this was the option the organization chose. Why? Why not
immediate euthanasia? Rebel was a lost cause. His condition was terminal. Keeping Rebel alive
would surely require a demand on the organization’s resources, including extra care and attention
from caregivers, as well as expensive food and pain medication. But this organization viewed
2

euthanasia as a last-resort option. In other words, they chose palliation. Palliation is an approach
to medicine that, in absence of a cure for disease or illness, provides comfort care with the goal
of alleviating the suffering of a patient during the onset of terminal illness. In absence of a cure,
comfort, then, is the goal. The sanctuary chose palliative care over euthanasia because the
caretakers there really knew Rebel—they really knew the nuances of Rebel’s personality. Rebel
was a horse who wanted to live. He was a lively and social spirit and was known to trot around
his pasture often, though he was in a lot of pain. He enjoyed socializing with the other horses, as
well as the caretakers. If Rebel was a horse who seemed to enjoy life, despite the degree of pain
he was experiencing, then it would be cruel to take his life early. In other words, the caretakers at
the sanctuary, through coming to really know Rebel, had a sense of Rebel’s character, his
interests, and preferences. The organization chose palliation over euthanasia precisely because
they were sensitive to Rebel’s end-of-life welfare. This was fascinating to me because the ethic
of Singer and Regan did not fully capture or explain the sanctuary’s ethic that emphasized
palliation and an attunement to Rebel’s needs. But if Regan and Singer’s animal ethics were not
the driving force behind the end-of-life medical decisions made for Rebel, then what was?
In this philosophical project, I attempt to suggest exactly what this “other ethic” is. This
project will focus on companion animal and human relations, or in other words, it will focus on
our ethical obligations to the animals we live with—our ‘pets.’ In the first chapter, I suggest that
there are three types of relationships that humans can have with animals. These are a relation of
instrumentalism, paternalism, and companionism, respectively. Such relations rest along a
spectrum, but I will argue that companionism is the ideal. After making and defending such
conceptual distinctions between human-animal relations, the next chapter will tackle the problem
of animal minds. Specifically, I will argue first that, though we cannot know exactly what an
3

animal is feeling or thinking, it is safe to assume first that animals do in fact have mental states.
Secondly, I’ll argue that animals in fact experience very complex emotions and work according
to what seems to be akin to practical reason. Finally, I’ll argue that it is possible to attribute
mental content to them accurately. Accurate attributions must be based on science and must be
done under a caring disposition. Next, chapter three will discuss what it means to care for
another being, both human and animal, and it will posit that the relation of companionism, the
ideal human-animal relationship, is an animal care ethic. This ethic is richer than an egalitarian
and impartial animal ethic operating under deontology or utilitarianism. I’ll show why the care
tradition in ethics works as a better framework for companion animals than the justice tradition.
In the fourth chapter, I will conclude with a discussion of what an ethic of companionism—an
animal care ethic—would look like if it were practiced in an end-of-life context.
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CHAPTER ONE
INSTRUMENTALISM, PATERNALISM, AND COMPANIONISM: THE MORAL
DIMENSIONS OF THE HUMAN-ANIMAL RELATIONSHIP

There are many contemporary philosophers and ethologists like Tom Regan, Jessica
Pierce, and Marc Bekoff, who argue that animals do in fact have minds, are conscious and
emotionally complex, and have preferences and interests. I agree with these positions, and will
take them for granted in this chapter and then revisit such arguments in further detail in chapter
two. If one accepts these arguments, then new questions arise regarding what we are to do with
the information that science and philosophy has given us. If domestic animals have preferences
and interests, and if animals are emotionally sensitive creatures, and especially if these emotional
beings are dependent on us for survival, peace, and safety, then how ought we to respond to their
specific preferences, desires, and needs? In this chapter I will first distinguish the different ways
that we can respond to animals in order to then prescribe what I think to be the appropriate moral
human-animal relationship—a relationship of companionism.
I discuss three kinds of relationships we can have with animals. When I say “we,” I do
not just mean veterinarians and professional animal caregivers. Specifically, I am concerned
herein with the people who live with animals, as some would say, “pet-owners.” We humans
relate to animals in three distinct ways. First, we can treat them as objects. Better yet and
secondly, we can treat them as dependents, and still better, we can care for them as companions.
I address these three kinds of relationships through a distinction between instrumentalism,
paternalism and companionism. These relationships, though conceptually distinct, rest along a
5

spectrum, with companionism as the ideal. Most people’s actual relationships with their animals
rest on different spaces of the spectrum at different times, and are thus how we relate to our
animals may differ in different contexts. The companionism approach to end-of-life care for our
animal friends demands more from us than the paternalist and instrumentalist approaches, and it
operates consistently within a framework of an ethics of care. This approach explains the right
(most morally praiseworthy) approach to end-of-life animal health care.
This paper operates within the boundary of companion animals, i.e., our common “pet”
animals only. This is not to say that wild and other domestic animals do not have interests,
preferences and needs; they most certainly do. However, as Clare Palmer has argued, these needs
are different in kind from the needs of domestic animals (Palmer 2007). Wild animals are
vulnerable in a different kind of way, and we humans definitely have a role to play in minimizing
our disturbance of the functioning of wild animal populations, biotic communities, and
ecosystems. Similarly, we owe other domestic animals such as lab research and factory farmed
animals certain moral considerations. But, as we breed our “pets” specifically for the purposes of
companionship, moral obligations emerge out of this particular relationship. We owe them care
similar to what we owe our human companions that are dependent on us at the end of their lives.

Instrumentalism
It is clear that René Descartes and Immanuel Kant were wrong about animals—animals
are not sophisticated machines, nor are they merely objects or property worthy only of
instrumental or indirect value; morally speaking, we cannot and should not do with them
whatever we please. The U.S. Animal Welfare Act (1966) shows well enough that our society
generally agrees that animals have interests, preferences, and a welfare. Philosophers Tom Regan
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and Peter Singer have championed moral arguments on the subject, and there are few today that
reject the notion that domestic animals have a welfare. Though progress has been made on the
subject of animal welfare, instrumentalism (or treatment of animals in terms of their use-value to
us) still runs deep in American culture, not just in terms of what we eat or how we test
pharmaceuticals, but also in terms of how we treat our companion animals. Though many cringe
at the thought of only considering animals in terms of their relative use-value to humans, it ought
to be pointed out that most, if not all of us, treat our animals as a means to some other end.
Anthrozoologist Hal Herzog illustrates this well through an example of male bachelors who use
puppies as social lubricants in order to increase their romantic prospects (2010). Conceivably,
such men do not merely take on puppies for the sake of meeting women. They may in fact
engage in a rich reciprocal relationship of companionship with their puppies. But this example
shows how using animals is subtle and nuanced, even if people do not use animals merely as a
means to some self-interested end in the strict Kantian sense.
Because of the pet production industry, there are more companion animals than there are
homes for them. In addition, in such an industry, ‘defective products’ are discarded. Breeders
and puppy mills often immediately euthanize animals if they are born deaf or blind, for example
(Herzog 2010; Pierce 2012). Many human companions also surrender their companion animals
to shelters because they, for various reasons, cannot continue care for their animal. These
animals are often euthanized in groups, as there is not enough room to house them. Bioethicist
Jessica Pierce calls euthanasia for such instrumental reasons “convenience euthanasia.” 1 She
writes,
‘Convenience Euthanasia’ describes the killing of a healthy pet, at the owner’s request,
for the sake of the owner’s convenience. E.g., “A woman with healthy five-year old
1

For more on ‘convenience euthanasia’ see also Bernard Rollin’s fourth section of Animal Rights and Human
Morality, 1981.
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cocker spaniel is moving and can’t take the dog to her new apartment and her boyfriend
doesn’t like the dog; she asks a vet to euthanize. A woman brings in a five-year-old male
cat who started spraying after the birth of the woman’s baby. She asks the vet to destroy
the cat. A breeder brings in a healthy six-week-old puppy with a moderate overbite.
Because the dog is not show quality, the breeder asks the vet to euthanize (179).
A similarly disturbing example of instrumentalism is seen in the way in which the administration
of pain medication for animals after spay and neuter surgery is sometimes an option rather than a
requirement for human companions. Pierce writes that her local humane society presents the $15
extra cost of pain medication as an option for animal companions, and that many people forgo
this extra charge. She writes, “perhaps the fact that the pain pills are presented as optional, and at
additional cost, give the impression that they are not strictly necessary, but rather, an
extravagance?” (106). To choose not to provide pain medication after surgery seems to reveal
that such human companions have no regard for their animal’s welfare interests in that context.
All of this reveals that the welfare and fate of an overwhelming number of companion animals in
the U.S. depends on the type of relationship we humans choose to have with them. The ones that
suffer most often are unfortunate victims of a culture of instrumentalism.
Mere instrumentalism is the wrong relationship we ought to have with animals. Though
our culture recognizes animals as property in the strict legal sense, it is clear that they are not
mere automata. They are subjects with needs and desires of their own. For this reason, we are
morally obligated to treat them better than we treat various other objects of ownership, such as
our cars. Regan writes that though “it is sometimes said that so long as animals are put to death
painlessly, so long as they do not suffer as they die, we should have no moral objection,” death is
a harm of deprivation (99), and in fact, “an untimely death is a deprivation of a quite
fundamental and irreversible kind” (100). In other words, convenience euthanasia is hard to
justify because animals have preferences, interests, desires, needs, and can feel pleasure and
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pain, and these things matter morally. This fact, according to Tom Regan demands from us a
recognition of their inherent value. So if we assume Regan’s position is right—that domestic
animals have interests, preference autonomy (Regan 85) and an overall welfare—then what
constitutes a “good death” for such creatures? “Euthanasia” literally means “good death,” but
“putting down” animals because there is no room in shelters or because they are born with an
overbite is no “good death”; these actions are motivated by an attitude of instrumentalism. Thus,
since their deaths are good for us and not the animal, maybe we should not call such cases
“euthanasia.” In The Last Walk, Pierce calls for a more nuanced language than “euthanasia” as
an umbrella term for animal death. I would like to add that being precise in our language will
help to reveal and reflect the different types of relationships we have with our animals when they
die. Thinkers like Clare Palmer worry that our relationships with companion animals are often
instrumental (2006, 182). Too often our relationships with companion animals involve an
unequal distribution of power. But, as Palmer argues, because for a long span of history humans
have bred animals to be docile and dependent on us and because we voluntarily bring individual
companion animals into our homes, we owe these animals special moral consideration. She
writes,
Humans have acted to create animals that are constituted such that they are unable to be
independent. This is a special kind of relationship, and it is widely accepted that special
relationships of this kind bring ethical obligations. For instance, in the case of [humans],
few would object to the claim that ‘a child is wronged by his parents if adequate care is
not given him, and the parent violates a duty if he or she neglects to give such care’
because ‘they bring their children into existence—or they adopt them—and it is this act
that imposes duties on the parent.’
She goes on to say,
The second level, though, follows a broader, social obligation arising out of the social
creation of dependent domesticated animals. That there is a population of domestic dogs
and cats, whether homed, unwanted, abandoned, or feral, is due to human action and
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human relations with these animals. On this basis, it can be argued that humans have
acquired ethical responsibilities toward humanly originating dependent animals that do
not exist toward, say, urban rat populations (where rats are wild in origin) (ibid 180).
Through the process of domestication, humans have created a class of beings that depend on
them for their very survival. With such creations comes responsibility. In Palmer’s essay on
killing animals in shelters, she concludes that we need to recognize our power relationship with
dependent animals, and in so doing, recognize our moral obligations to dependent animals—
obligations of which we have created. Borrowing from Palmer, I would like to emphasize that
mere instrumentalism, i.e., having only a relationship of dominance over animals that ignores
their individual interests and preferences, is morally inappropriate in an end-of-life care context,
if not also in any context. However, at the same time, we know that domestic animals are not
autonomous, free, independent moral agents like ourselves. Thus, as their relationship with us
will always be one of dependence, it may seem that a caregiving framework must lie somewhere
in the realm of paternalism, given the kind of relationship we have (and have created) with
companion animals. Thus, we will look more into paternalism as a framework of ethical
caregiving for animals in the next section.

Paternalism
Historically, in bioethics, paternalism has been a bad word, and rightly so. Paternalism
used to be the standard approach in the medical world before the rise of feminism. In fact, a lot
of the progress in bioethics on the issue of patient rights stems from a history of sex and race
discrimination. The doctor-patient power relationship was not always an equal one: the physician
(usually male) had his degree and wealth of knowledge, and the patient was completely
dependent on their physician’s best judgment. However, patients grew tired of listening to
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authoritative physicians tell them what they could and could not do with their bodies. Thus, the
principles of patient autonomy and informed consent arose, and conquered the old way of doing
medicine, much to the benefit of many people. Thus, for us humans the term paternalism
sometimes connotes the restrictive “old way” of doing medicine, where not unlike a parent, the
“doctor knows best” and the patient is subject to his judgment and treatment. However,
paternalism can also mean simply acting on behalf of the best interests of an individual who may
not be able to speak, or make autonomous decisions for his or herself. Much like the parent-child
relationship between humans, domestic animals are not purely autonomous and independent. As
they completely rely on humans in health care decisions, paternalism may be more relevant to
animal health care the way it is similarly relevant to a human child’s health care, though we
dismiss paternalism in the context of human adults.
Tom Regan writes about when paternalism is the appropriate medical framework for
animals. Regan makes a distinction between an animal’s preference-interests and welfareinterests (Regan 87). A preference-interest is anything an animal (let’s say a dog) is interested in
(e.g., eating the chocolate cake on the counter). A welfare-interest, by contrast, is something that
is good for the welfare of the dog, irrespective of preference. This second interest is logically
distinct from the former interest. Consider that the chocolate cake on the counter would make the
dog very sick. It would be in the dog’s welfare-interest not to eat the cake, though the dog would
prefer or desire to eat it. Paternalism becomes relevant when preference and welfare interests
conflict. The role of the caretaker is sometimes to step in and prevent the dog from acting on his
preference interest, through a consideration of the dog’s welfare-interest. We do this with
children too, necessarily. Regan’s distinction here allows us to talk of paternalism in a way that
benefits animals. Contrary to instrumentalism (which ignores both preference interests and
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welfare interests of an animal), paternalism, through a protection of an animal’s welfareinterests, recognizes that animals can and do have both preference interests and welfare interests.
The paternalist model grants that an animal is a subject of his or her own, even if the animal is
unable or incapable of articulating or making medical decisions for his or herself. Thus,
paternalism is the next step in a moral progression toward the appropriate relationship we ought
to have with our animals.
Though the chocolate cake example clearly shows that paternalism is an appropriate
moral relationship to have with one’s animal in some contexts, this relationship may not be the
most appropriate relationship at the end of our animal’s life. The problem with paternalism with
animals in this context relates to the problem we have with paternalism in the human medical
setting: specifically, we can get another individual’s welfare-interests wrong. Pierce writes that
in the medical field, studies have shown that a parent’s understanding of their minor’s welfare
does not map well with how minors understand their own welfare interests. This problem is
exaggerated with animals, as (unlike children) they cannot verbally express their interests
explicitly to us. There is a lot of interpretation and educated guessing involved on the part of
humans in understanding the welfare-interests of an animal. I will call this ‘the problem of
projection.’ This is the likely yet morally undesirable possibility that we could interpret another’s
welfare-interests wrongly. The problem of projection is an epistemological problem, and it is a
problem that will always exist. However, as I will show in chapter two, I believe this problem
could be partially alleviated through science, namely cognitive ethology, but only if it is paired
with an appropriate caregiving relationship between humans and their animals. Lori Gruen seems
to understand the problem of projection when she writes in “Ethics and Animals,”
All relationships, between humans, and between humans and non-humans, can be
characterized as imbued with power dynamics. Power becomes problematic when it is
12

occluded or abused. Many human relationships with companion animals are
characterized by reciprocal care and attention [….] When you have to figure out what a
very different kind of being, who cannot speak, wants or needs, you must develop the
capacity for empathy that can be very useful in other contexts, with humans and other
animals” (Gruen 2011, 157).
Paternalism, as a moral caregiving framework for animals, maintains such a power relationship,
which as Gruen rightly warns could be a problematic one. Generally, despite the human
companion’s attitudes or intentions, when we speak for our animals, or speak on behalf of what
we think are their interests, we may be wrong. With the dependency relationship that is inherent
in the human-animal relationship, there is an unequal distribution of power, just as a parent has
much more power over their child. Companion animals will always be dependent on us, and so
we must be aware of their vulnerability when we are responsible for them at the end of their
lives. Here Gruen shows that we need a kind of enriched paternalism in regard to domestic
animals that accounts for the animal’s best interest as best we can know it. The challenge lies in
trying to articulate what this “enriched” sort of relationship looks like. We want to say that
human caregivers ought to be very careful not to project their own interests onto their dependents
in end-of-life caregiving decisions. But what does being “very careful” mean? This will be
fleshed out briefly in the next section, and in much more detail in chapter three. But it is
important to understand that paternalism slips up when the person in authority takes for granted
that they know best what the patient’s interests are. For companion animals, an attitude of
paternalism that takes for granted their welfare interests and preferences is dangerous. An
enriched paternalism would concern itself with an immense sensitivity to the patient’s interests.
Thus, such an enriched paternalism is what I call companionism, and is the third, and ideal, kind
of human-animal relationship.
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Companionism
An enriched paternalism is a relationship of companionship. Before laying out what this
approach looks like, I ought to mention the differences between human companions and animal
companions. The term “companion” is used in a few different ways for humans. A human
companion could be a dear friend, spouse, or lifelong partner. However, the term companion is
also used to mean someone whose employment is to attend to elderly or disabled people who are
otherwise unable to care for themselves. Similarly, there are companion animals that are also
known as “service” animals, which help people with disabilities. However, generally, and for the
purposes of this paper, companion animals are our cross-species friends that live with us, are part
of our family unit, and are creatures that we rely and depend on, and reciprocally rely and
depend on us for love and, well, companionship! However, some take issue with this term,
including anthrozoologist Hal Herzog, whose reservations of the term stem from good reasons:
I don’t particularly like the term companion animal […] Substituting the term guardian
for pet owner is also problematic. Unlike the guardian of a human child, a pet’s
“guardian” is allowed to give away, sell, or sterilize their ward against its will. They can
even have their companion euthanized if they tire of it. The terms companion animal and
pet guardian are linguistic illusions that enable us to pretend we do not own the animals
we live with (Herzog 74).
Herzog is right to be wary of ‘linguistic illusions’ that may justify the further perpetuation of
harm to animals. For instance, the pet industry is guilty of perpetuating false notions of harmony
between people and animals that contribute to an overpopulation problem with animals and an
overcrowding in shelters. This then results in massive accounts of “convenience euthanasia,”
discussed earlier in the section on instrumentalism. However, Herzog seems to be conflating
facts about the world with what we ought to do. In other words, he takes what is descriptively
true about general human actions towards animals as a sufficient reason to reject the term
‘companion.’ However, since I am concerned with ethics, I am using the term companion
14

normatively; I am not merely using it to describe how people generally behave towards animals.
For my purposes, then, the term ‘companion’ sits within a web of moral obligations that emerge
out of the particular kind of relationship it represents. ‘Companions’ ought to be committed
parties in a caring relationship who are sensitive to each other’s needs and interests, for better or
for worse. It is in this sense that I use the term ‘companion.’
A thorough explanation of the companionship model will be articulated in chapter three. I
will briefly mention some key features of the companionship model here for the purposes of
understanding how it is conceptually different, or “richer,” than the model of paternalism. The
companionship model, no doubt, is the most difficult. Jessica Pierce recognizes this difficulty,
An ailing pet can certainly create tensions within a multispecies family system. One way
to avoid this is simply to opt out: euthanize the animal before he or she really causes
problems or in some way inconveniences the family. Another option—the one I favor—is
adaptation. But this I know, is easier said than done (70).
If we avoid the instrumentalist route and try to give our animals the greatest care within our
means, then we must embody all aspects of companionism which I will now mention. First, we
must recognize that the animal has his or her own preferences which may or may not match up
with our own preferences. In other words, our companion animals are individuals with interests
and desires of their own. Second, we must recognize, appreciate, and reciprocate the love and
care that has been shared between us and our companion animals throughout our lives. This
means that we know that when the going gets tough, we will be patient and kind to our animals,
despite challenging changes in personality, behavior, and affect that come with our animal’s age
and terminal illness. Third, we must be aware of the assumptions we have about our animal’s
interests. When we catch ourselves making assumptions about our animal’s preferences and
interests, we may reflect on the assumptions and question them. This means that, rather than a
caregiver assuming that he or she knows what the animal’s best interests are, he or she
15

recognizes from the start that they are interpreting this, and that there is always a possibility that
they are wrong about it. Making decisions for one’s animal is thus something that people
struggle with. But because the companionship model recognizes that they could get their
animal’s interests and preferences wrong, they will be careful in their interpretations. I will say
more on how one can be more careful in chapter three. In an end-of-life care context, this can
sometimes be better than the paternalist model, as we will not always “know best.” This means
not overlooking our animal companion’s level of suffering and avoiding calling the vet simply
because we want a few more days with him or her. Lastly, we must adapt to our companion
animal’s changing needs and preferences that come with illness and old age.

Conclusion
I have shown the possible ways that we can relate to the animals that we love.
Understanding these conceptual distinctions will help us develop a caregiving framework for
animals in an end-of-life context. Here I have suggested that in the context of end-of-life care for
animals, the model of companionism is the most morally praiseworthy relationship we could
have with them. I will develop this framework more thoroughly in chapter three, after a
discussion about the mental states of animals and what we can know about the content of them.
For now, I have shown that though the companionship model admits that we do not always know
what is best for our animals, it is unassuming and reciprocates the love and care that animals
have given us throughout their lives. Such a model frames the way that caregivers ought to
understand end-of-life care, and thus this model ought to be the moral framework for animal
hospice and palliative care for the human companion.
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CHAPTER TWO
ANIMAL MINDS AND END OF LIFE ETHICS

The last chapter laid the conceptual groundwork for the three types of relationships
humans can have with animals and it operated under two assumptions. I assumed that animals,
and specifically companion animals such as dogs, cats, and horses, are conscious beings with
desires, interests, and preferences, and have the capacity to feel complex emotions. Secondly, I
assumed that humans can know, or at least accurately attribute, such mental states to animals.
The validity of these assumptions is crucial for human and animal end-of-life ethics.
Specifically, the understanding that we have of human and animal minds in turn affects the
practice of medicine and the way that we provide care. For example, if our animal companions
not only suffer physically but also psychologically (especially emotionally) at the end of their
lives in a way similar to humans, then we ought to take care to attend to both their physical as
well as psychological needs in such contexts.
Care ethicist Virginia Held has argued that a caring person has both a caring motive and
does caring work. That is, caring is a practice, not just a disposition (Held 2006, 44-57). Caring
action then requires the caring person to be attuned or sensitive to the recipient’s needs. Such an
attunement requires a degree of knowledge about what is good for the recipient. Held argues,
if persons are thoroughly unaware of what others are feeling and thinking, and grossly
unable to read the moods and intentions of others, they would not be very capable of
sustaining caring relations or engaging in practices of care. They would not, I think,
really be caring persons (Held 53).
Held says that caring practice can be improved through a greater knowledge and understanding
of the other (e.g., of the other’s interests, preferences, needs) as it relates to the practice. In other
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words, knowledge about the best known ways to care for something or someone improves the
way that a person can care. Thus, if we are concerned with caring for our animal companions, we
ought to be able to first say something about their interests, preferences, feelings, and emotions
in a way that is more than a mere projection of our assumptions. What is at stake in this project is
whether we can and do have the ability to care in such an informed way with animals.
In addition to the fact that accurately attributing mental states to animals is crucial for
care ethics generally and in an end-of-life context, the alternative position, namely skepticism of
animal mental states, is undesirable for science and ethics. Thus, my argument in this chapter
will go as follows: first I will address the extent of our knowledge of animal mental states,
drawing from philosophy and science. Then I will show why it is legitimate to attribute mental
states to animals, responding to objections. I’ll suggest that philosophy and science can tell us a
lot about what we can know about animal preferences. Finally, I’ll conclude that assuming
animals have mental states and interpreting animal preferences correctly is critical to providing
the best care for companion animals at the end of their lives.

Evidence of Mental States in Animals (and Humans)
We usually account for mental states in animals by appealing to commonly observed
behaviors that are easily interpretable. For example, when a dog runs to his water bowl, we
commonly attribute to the dog the feeling of thirst, the desire to have a drink, and the belief that
running to the water bowl will satisfy this desire. This assumption is made for a few reasons.
First, we assume such beliefs and desires in animals because we have the capacity to abstract
from our own immediate interests and can imagine what we might feel like if we were in the
animal’s position. Second, over time, we come to acquire a great deal of observable knowledge
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of the behavior of the animals that we live with. By observing the day-to-day behavior of our
animal companions, we can infer certain behaviors that may happen in the present or the future
on the basis of our holistic understanding of the animal’s behavior in the past, in similar contexts.
Evidence for animal and human mentation thus rests on what I’ll call “as-if” behavior. “As if”
behaviors are observable actions given by other beings that indicate that others behave “as if”
they feel, believe, or desire something. My position is that “as if” behavior provides good enough
information to guide most caregiving decisions with humans and animals.
Philosopher Tom Regan in The Case for Animal Rights (1983) argues that we have good
reasons to believe that mammalian species are “not only conscious and sentient but also have
beliefs, desires, memory, a sense of the future, self-awareness, and an emotional life, and can act
intentionally” (77). Regan enfranchises animals with autonomous subjectivity, arguing that
animals have preference autonomy. In other words, animals are autonomous beings because they
have preferences coupled with “the ability to initiate action with a view to satisfying them” (85).
The fact that animals have this capacity demands our ethical treatment of them. Regan concludes
that experiencing subjects of a life, such as animals and humans, have inherent worth or value
that we must respect.
Regan helps us frame how to give content to non-human mental states by arguing that we
can accurately attribute beliefs and desires to animals only when we put their behavior in a
holistic context, rather than take each action or behavior in its singularity. For example, if Fido is
wagging his tail and sitting impatiently by the door of a house, we do not understand the
animal’s beliefs merely by focusing only on the act of tail-wagging, separate from a larger
context. Rather, we can anticipate that the dog believes, e.g., that his companion is about to enter
the house by his behavior if we understand the dog’s behavioral history and we also observe his
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behavior during and after the fact that his companion has walked through the door. Regan argues
that “[b]ehavior must be understood in context, holistically, if it is to be understood at all […] we
cannot say what Fido believes just by viewing his tail-wagging as a piece of isolated behavior”
(68-9). Thus, we can, if we consider the whole context of behavior, fairly easily, test the
accuracy of our attributions of belief to animals. The good news here is that one does not have to
be an ethologist or a veterinarian to accurately attribute many beliefs to animals. Regan shows
us that if we operate under a holistic view of animal behavior, then we can discriminate between
our animal companion’s behaviors in different circumstances, recognizing that their behavior can
change in time, depending on the context.
Now, when we interpret commonly observed animal behavior, we are not granting mental
states to them on such strict grounds as, for example, on the basis that they inhabit a language, or
on the basis that we can know that they think in abstractions, etc. Philosopher David Degrazia, in
Taking Animals Seriously (1996), argues that we ought not to conditionally grant mentation to
animals on the strict basis of human mentation. He thinks that animals operate as if they have
practical reason. Here’s his example: “(1) I desire carrots; (2) I believe opening the fridge is a
means to getting carrots; (3) I should (other things being equal) open the fridge (Degrazia 141).
He later adds that for belief-desire interactions to be a result of practical reasoning, they should
also be action-explaining. In other words, the interaction between the being’s beliefs and desires
should be related such that we could infer an explanation of the behavior (142). Consider the
example of my Aussie, Ace, running to his water bowl after a long run. We can easily attribute
the desire of thirst and the belief that running to the water bowl will satisfy this desire, and if
such inferences are accurate, this shows that Ace is employing an animal version of practical
reasoning.
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Degrazia does not believe that for us to attribute mental content the animals must think in
abstractions of things or must employ a language. Ace’s thirsty behavior is sufficient for me to
go and fill his water bowl, if it is empty. I do not have to sit there and wait for him to speak in
American English, “Casie, I am thirsty. I desire a drink of water, and I believe that you are my
best means of acquiring it.” Similarly, we do not always require language use to care for humans.
If I see my sister fall off of her bike, her knee is bloody, and she is crying, I do not require her to
tell me that she is hurt and needs help. When I observe this state of affairs, the appropriate
response is to run to her and try to address her needs as best as I can in a timely manner. Thus,
attributing feelings, beliefs, and desires to both humans and animals can be done roughly,
without requiring sophisticated language use, or indication that those in need in fact are thinking
in abstractions. When Degrazia uses the term ‘concept’ for animals he means that their beliefs
have some content. For him, a concept is simply a constituent of belief. Some thinkers require
that for any being to have a concept, they must not only discriminate from their here-and-now
perceptions, but they must also conceptualize in abstractions of things. For example, Collin Allen
and Marc Hauser argue that while studies of pigeons sorting pictures into categories of “tree”
may show that pigeons have internal representations of “tree” when prompted by visuals, these
experiments do not show that pigeons have a concept of “tree.” They argue that “we would
attribute an abstract concept to an organism if there is evidence supporting the presence of a
mental representation that is independent of solely perceptual information” (Allen and Hauser
51-54). In other words, Allen and Hauser require that true ‘concepts’ are mental representations
that exist independently of perceptual prompts. But for Degrazia, the requirement that animals
think in abstractions is too strong a position. He says that “while perception and belief are
distinct concepts, our perceptions generally determine our beliefs” (152). It seems here that
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Degrazia supports a view that experience and our perceptions provide adequate information for
holding beliefs and making corrections when our or our animal’s beliefs are false. Thus,
precision is not important for the attribution of mental content. He writes that “[i]n order to assert
something meaningful about the content of animal beliefs, it is sufficient to make a very rough
attribution. There is no need to establish exactly what animals believe (to the extent that the
context is determinate) in order to show that they believe something and approximately what it
is” (155). Thus, Regan and Degrazia have shown what we can know about the mental content of
animals based merely on common observables. First, we must consider the history of the
animal’s behavior in particular contexts of the past holistically, in order to infer the present and
future behavior of animals with a degree of accuracy. Secondly, we can explain the behavior of
animals in terms of beliefs and desires roughly, as we would with humans in the absence of
language. Degrazia shows how animals employ a kind of practical reasoning that is not
dependent on thinking in abstractions or through the structure of language.
In addition to the ‘common sense’ view of concept attribution in animals discussed
above, a breadth of recent ethological science supports the view that we not only can attribute
mental content to animals, but also that animals are capable of very complex mental experiences.
Cognitive ethology is the comparative, evolutionary, and ecological study of animal minds
(Bekoff 30). Cognitive ethologists prefer to study animals in their natural environment, rather
than in a laboratory setting. Recently, ethologists have found that animals are not only
physiologically similar to us, but they are more similar to us emotionally than we previously had
thought.
In developing a basis of understanding of animals, we ought to look to cognitive ethology
then, as well as drawing from common observables. Cognitive Ethologist Marc Bekoff argues
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that “ethologists often make their arguments using analogies.” This is because “all we can ‘see’
of an emotion are the signs of it, or how it manifests itself in an animal’s behavior or actions and
how it affects an animal’s neurological chemistry” (36). Under such a methodology, Bekoff has
found that animals are capable of experiencing both primary and secondary emotions. That is,
not only do they have the immediate, reflexive “fight or flight” responses to stimuli (e.g., fear
and aggression), but also more complex and nuanced secondary emotions. Secondary emotions
are deliberate and reflective, rather than immediate and reflexive. Empathy and compassion are
two secondary emotions in animals that have been well documented in ethological science,
though people have recognized this for a long time in their everyday observations of animals. For
example, studies suggest that consolation reduces stress levels in chimpanzees, 2 and lab mice are
more attuned to the pain of their cage-mates than to unfamiliar mice.3 In addition, Bekoff writes,
“In one classic study, a hungry rhesus monkey would not take food if doing so subjected another
monkey to an electric shock” (11). Bekoff’s scientific position on animal emotions is this, “even
if animal emotions aren’t exactly the same as our own, or for that matter the same across species,
this doesn’t mean that animals don’t feel. In fact […] animal emotions are not restricted to
“instinctual responses,” but entail what seems to be a good deal of conscious thought” (12).
While it may be true that dogs and cats cannot converse with us about philosophy, for example,
there is a great deal of information transferring involved in our interactions with animals. “Tails
talk to us about what animals are feeling, and so too do various postures, gaits, facial
expressions, sounds, and odors” (Bekoff 13).

2

See Fraser, Orlaith, et al. “Stress Reduction through Consolation in Chimpanzees,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 105, No. 25 (Jun. 24, 2008): 8557-8562
3
See Langford, Dale, et al. “Social Modulation of Pain as Evidence for Empathy in Mice,” Science, Vol. 312, No.
5782 (Jun. 30, 2006): 1967-1970
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Other scientists (A. Boissy et al 2007, 376) have argued that, although none of us can
prove the existence of animal emotion, we ought to study animal emotion because animals are
functionally similar to humans. They argue that we ought to study positive emotions (behavior
indicative of well-being or happiness), and not merely negative emotions in animals. Positive
and negative emotions, according to evolutionary psychology, are adaptive mechanisms that
allow the organism to confront or respond to certain environmental conditions and situations. A.
Boissy et al. argue that “given the very nature of emotional self-experience, there is ultimately no
way to know if animals experience emotions similar to humans. However, behavior, structure,
and brain chemistry are similar in humans and in a large number of animal species. It is therefore
likely that they feel as we do, including not only well-studied negative emotions, but also
positive ones” (376-77). New disciplines have emerged in the study of emotions, both human
and animal. For example, the fields of affective neuroscience and positive psychology have
sought to investigate positive emotions.4 These fields show that there is evidence from a
cognitive, behavioral, neurobiological, and physiological standpoint that shows the existence of
positive emotions such as joy and excitement in animals. The most obvious way to measure
animal emotions is behaviorally, e.g., in terms of social behavior, reproductive behavior, play,
and grooming. However, animal emotions can be measured in other ways. For example, A.
Boissy et al. survey studies of animal emotion in terms of dopamine or opioid levels, in terms of
heart rate variability (HRV),5 and in terms of immunological activity (380-83).6 The fact that
animals have positive emotions, and that we can measure them in various ways is important to
4

See work by Colin Allen, Jaak Panksepp, Michel Cabanac or Kent Berridge.
For example studies have shown a significant correlation between infant HRV and the infant’s positive reaction to
games of ‘peek-a-boo.’ See Fox NA. “Psychophysiological correlates of emotional reactivity during the first year of
life” Dev. Psychol. 1989; 25:364-72
6
Specifically, A. Boissy et al. write that “[i]n pigs, positive and negative psychological experiences affected
immune system parameters antagonistically, depending on the success of coping. Hence, immune status may be
another indicator of long-lasting emotional state (or mood), and immunological parameters may be indicators of
frequent positive (or negative) emotions” (383).
5
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ethics—it makes a difference in how we care for them. This is because “[t]he emotional
sensitivity or temperament of an animal has an important influence on its welfare” (A. Boissy et
al. 385). A. Boissy et al. conclude then that positive emotions over a steady and repeated
duration commonly lead to a “global state of ‘happiness’” in most animals and humans (390).
Though the concept of happiness is hard to define, especially for humans and in philosophy,
these authors use the term happiness to mean an internal state of well-being or quality of life.
These researchers believe that inquiry into positive affective states in animals is crucial to any
serious assessment of the welfare and quality of life in animals.

Anthropomorphism and the Problem of Projection
The last section discussed what we can know from the “as if” behavior of animals. There
I was operating under the assumption that animals had mental states similar to mine. Some call
this sort of attribution ‘anthropomorphism.’ It is worth mentioning that there are better and worse
ways of attributing mental states to animals. Proponents of what is called ‘critical’
anthropomorphism argue that anthropomorphism is not bad per se, and when it is used critically,
it can be an adequate and efficient tool for science and ethics. Scientist Gordon Burghardt first
developed this concept, rejecting the implication that “there is no value in the scientific testing of
the hypotheses generated by the anthropomorphic stance” (Burghardt 136). He developed such a
concept to open the doors to more effective science. He argues, “[w]e need to use all of our
scientific and natural history knowledge about a species, including its physiology, ecology, and
sensory abilities to develop testable hypotheses, which may indeed be based on ‘hmm, what
would I do if I were in a similar situation to other species?” (137). Philosopher John Fisher also
offers a common-sense approach to animals, arguing that “[t]he charge of anthropomorphism
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oversimplifies a complex issue—animal consciousness—and it tries to inhibit consideration of
positions that ought to be evaluated in a more open-minded empirical manner” (3). Fisher makes
a distinction between imaginative and interpretive anthropomorphism. Imaginative
anthropomorphism is the representation of fictional or imaginary animals as similar to us, e.g.,
Bambi, The Cat in the Hat, etc. On the other hand, interpretive anthropomorphism is when we
describe our observations of animal behavior in terms of intentional actions. While the former
anthropomorphism is clearly uncritical, the latter is not uncritical necessarily (Fisher 5-6).
I think that theologist and ethicist Fredrik Karlsson offers the most helpful representation
of ‘critical’ anthropomorphism. He argues that anthropomorphism is a skill—a skill of making
analogies—and it is a valuable skill when used intentionally and critically (Karlsson 719).
Psychological anthropomorphism is the attribution of human mental and emotional states to
animals; in science and philosophy, this is the sort of anthropomorphism that is most talked
about. Giving content to the term “critical,” Karlsson argues that psychological
anthropomorphism can be justifiable, and even scientifically and philosophically praiseworthy,
in many different cases. For example, such anthropomorphism is helpful when it accurately
reports observable similarities between humans and animals (i.e. if a dog reportedly behaves as a
human would behave if she were thirsty). It is also critical if it aligns with some of the core
values of science, such as predictive value, or if it gives the simplest explanation to a problem,
etc. (Karlsson 712). To illustrate how to use anthropomorphism critically, we ought to first
discuss uncritical examples of the attribution of mental states to animals. We all know of cases
where human projection of animal beliefs and desires truly goes wrong. For example,
Anthrozoologist Hal Herzog, in his book Some We Love, Some We Hate, Some We Eat (2010),
cites a man he saw on a river rafting trip who had brought his Chihuahua, “running the rapids of
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a freezing Class III river.” Herzog argues that anthropomorphism is to blame for the man’s belief
that the Chihuahua would enjoy that trip (60).7 The pet and fashion industries also contribute to
such anthropomorphism. Herzog argues, “A lot of pet owners believe their animals enjoy
dressing up;” pets today are treated as consumers of their own with assumed desires for
raincoats, summer camp, and weddings, for example (76-77). Here, then, the bad forms of
anthropomorphism are when humans conflate their own personal interests with the animal’s.
Such cases of ‘uncritical’ anthropomorphism then occur because the human subject fails to see
the distinct separateness of the animal other. I will talk in more detail about the notion of
separateness and difference in chapter three. Like the Chihuahua on the icy river, dogs that are
dressed up in designer clothing are treated as dolls or accessories and not as distinct and different
subjects. They are treated as appendages of their “owner,” and not as companions in their own
right.
But the example of the Chihuahua on the icy river is obviously an uncritical attribution of
mental concepts onto animals. The fact that some people project their own interests onto their
animals does not then necessitate that we are thus doomed to a culture of dangerous
anthropomorphism and projection. This sort of selfish projection and how to avoid it will be
discussed in further detail in chapter three. Fisher illustrates that projection is not as much of a
problem as hard skeptics make it out to be. He gives an example of ‘critical’ psychological
anthropomorphism, arguing that just as a good chess player would try to get into the head of an
opponent—guessing what the opponent would do, not what he himself would do—humans can
understand the interests of animals as separate from our own.

7

Common “as-if” observables would indicate easily to an onlooker that the Chihuahua most likely would rather be
home. However, for a larger dog, this may be different. Indeed, many rafters have “river dogs,” but they’re hardly
ever Chihuahuas.
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Take the simplest example: next door a deer is munching on my neighbor’s grass. I
immediately think: that deer must be hungry. I haven’t arrived at this thought by
thinking: if I were to eat my neighbor’s grass I would be hungry. If I started to munch on
the lawn, I would perhaps have had a nervous breakdown or be under the influence of a
drug. My reasoning was, rather, based on how I represent deer, as creatures who make
grass a regular part of their diet (Fisher 14).
Here, Fisher shows the clear difference between ascribing mental states to others in a given
situation, and how the perceiving subject personally would respond. Fisher says that “[w]hat
appears absurd in the projection argument is the idea that I can only reason from my own case,
that I know about myself and only about myself from the inside and must somehow project
myself onto the outside world to form any further inferences about people or animals” (ibid).
Fisher concludes that projection is not something that we are stuck with. If we have developed
strong bases for understanding the other, then projection should not happen.
Here I will amend what Fisher says, and add that if we have a basis of understanding the
other and we genuinely care for and care about the other, then we can better avoid projection.
To illustrate, let’s say for the purposes of argument that I really love jewelry. Let’s also say that
my aunt Judy loves to knit and is a yarn connoisseur. I know that my aunt Judy loves to knit and
recall that every Christmas she requests yarn or knitting books as a gift. In other words, I truly
have an understanding of what Judy’s interests are, and understand that my interests are separate
from hers. However, let’s say that I don’t really care. I buy her jewelry for Christmas, rather than
something related to her interests. This illustration shows that though I knew what Judy liked, I
didn’t really care. At some point, in the end, my actions showed a conflation of her interests with
mine. If we are to relate this example to the problem of projection, it shows that while it is
necessary to have a basis of understanding the other (or knowledge about what is good for the
other), such knowledge is insufficient for avoiding projection. Caring for or about the other,
including what their interests and preferences are, also matters a great deal. I will talk more
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about what it means to care for and about the other in chapter three. But what this example
shows in addition to Fisher’s example is that we need both knowledge of the other and we need
to care for the other. Fisher’s example shows how knowledge is a necessary condition for us to
avoid projection. I agree, and think that it is a necessary condition for us to care for others, but it
alone does not imply that a person will keep in mind the best interest of the other. A caring
disposition and practice is also required in avoiding projection.

Mentation as the Best Explanation of Animal (and Human) Behavior
The last section showed evidence for how we can attribute mental states to animals. The
goal of this section will be to show why explaining animal (and human) behavior in terms of
mental states is much better than the alternative explanation: the view that animals and human
behavior ought to be explained mechanistically. Many people who are skeptical of animal
mentation argue that an attribution of mental states to animals is either (1) bad science, or (2) is
bad for science. They claim that such mental attributions are cases of “dangerous
anthropomorphism” (Kennedy, 1992). In this section I will address the first claim—that
anthropomorphism is bad science. I will frame a response to this claim in terms of what counts as
the best explanation of animal behavior. The question here is whether it is better to explain
animal behavior in some other way than in psychological terms.
First, if we are to consider whether anthropomorphism is bad science, then we ought to
take science seriously. If we are to take science seriously, we ought to rely on empirical
evidence. Evolutionary theory is backed by extensive empirical evidence, so let’s start there. The
theory of evolution is a theory incremental of change. Changes in inherited characteristics of
organisms occur gradually, over successive generations in response to an array of environmental
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conditions. Though we may want to say that humans are apical in the timeline of such
evolutionary processes, we have not ‘evolved out’ of such processes and are still very much a
part of this historical lineage. Therefore, any difference between humans and non-human beings
must be understood as a difference in degree, not in kind. This means that if we are to have two
interpretations of animal behavior—either in terms of psychological states or in other such terms
as automatic mechanisms—we must consider such differing interpretations in regard to an
understanding of human behavior as well. As we are a part of an historical evolutionary lineage,
we seem to function similarly to animals in terms of biochemistry and physiology just as it seems
right to grant that a flower functions similarly to a tree.8 It seems that an interpretation of animals
as mere automata is thus ungrounded, for this would seem to separate us as different in kind from
animals and would seem to ignore the fact that humans are part of the class Mammalia. It would
be bad science to point out a fundamental difference between humans and animals.
Some have argued that language use fundamentally separates humans from all or most
other animals. They go on to argue that in order to have beliefs and desires, one must inhabit a
language. They conclude then that attributing mental states to animals is a case of
anthropomorphism—of bad science. However, philosopher Tom Tyler disagrees. Drawing from
Heidegger, Tyler argues that when we say that we are anthropomorphizing, we are assuming that
we first know ahead of time what human beings are. According to Tyler, this assumption is
arrogant and ungrounded. He says that “simply by employing the term ‘anthropomorphism’ one
has already adopted a set of unexamined assumptions about human beings” (Tyler 21). In other
words, when we assume that talking about animals in human terms we are “humanizing”
animals, we assume an anthropocentric ontology that ignores our own membership in the animal
kingdom, among other things. Secondly, rather than anthropomorphism being dangerous for
8

Thanks to Dr. Soazig LeBihan for this example.
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science, as Kennedy argues, Tyler argues the reverse. He says that it is dangerous for science to
assume that there exists such mental attributes and behaviors that are distinctly human, and
human only. Using the phenomenon of convergent evolution, he illustrates this point
persuasively,
It is dangerous and misleading to suppose that attributes or behaviors ‘belong’ to the
creatures who display them, even in those cases where these creatures seem to be the only
ones who exhibit a particular quality. This point is perhaps best demonstrated by an
example of convergent evolution, the phenomenon whereby the same adaptation is
evident in entirely unrelated species. Bats are well known for their distinctive means of
navigation: sonar, also known as ‘echolocation’ […] But as Richard Dawkins has pointed
out, sonar is by no means unique to bats. It has evolved, independently, in two different
genera of birds, in dolphins and whales, and to a lesser extent, in shrews, rats, and seals.

Now, speaking to the assumption that only humans exhibit mental states, or rather, higher-order
mental capacities such as reason, language, and secondary emotions like compassion and
empathy, Tyler responds,
That a trait has been identified in only one class of creatures thus far is no guarantee that
it is unique to that class of creatures, be they bears, bats, or life forms more alien still.
The fact that, to date, the only creatures who have been observed exhibiting trait x are
human beings, does not justify the claim that trait x is fundamentally and uniquely
human, no matter how clever or intellectually advanced it is (Tyler 21-22).
When framing a conversation about the mental states of living beings, Tyler is helpful to show us
that assumptions of human superiority or of difference in kind to other animals are dangerous
assumptions. Thus on the face of it, the argument that anthropomorphism is bad science seems to
fall short.
But the skeptic could argue in response that there is no way to directly observe the mental
states of other animals. Attributing mental states to animals is a projection, in absence of ‘hard
proof’ or direct observables, and the only way to prove such states would be either for animals to
articulate their feelings, beliefs, and desires through language, or for us to ‘get into the head’ of
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the animal other. It should be pointed out that this is a serious problem for attributing mental
states to humans as well. I don’t know precisely what my sister is thinking when she falls off of
her bike. But she need not say anything for me to know that she is feeling physical and emotional
pain. She’s hurting, and if many people saw her fall, it’s likely that she’s embarrassed. I don’t
have to actually get in her head to know this. Thus, my immediate inference from witnessing this
state of affairs and her behavior shows that my attribution of her mental states is good enough
such that I can respond appropriately. Further, a robot could hypothetically tell me, in
grammatically formulated American English, that it is in pain, but this is not sufficient grounds
for assuming that the robot is in fact in pain. While there’s no denying that it is easier to
accurately guess at what my sister is feeling when she falls off of her bike than it would be for
me to guess at what an animal is feeling, there are still physiological, social, and emotional
continuities between humans and animals that are morally relevant in a similar way to humanhuman continuities demanding of our moral attention.
But there are still what Fisher calls “hard anthropocentrists” who find any form of
anthropomorphism dangerous for science (Fisher 7). Animal behaviorist J.S. Kennedy has
written a whole book defending such a skeptical position. In The New Anthropomorphism
(1992), he argues that science cannot tell us either way (yes or no) that animals feel pain, let
alone whether or not animals have preferences, interests, desires, intentions, etc. Anything short
of a position of agnosticism on the issue of animal psychology is thus dangerous for Kennedy;
attributing the capacity to suffer to animals would be then a troubling and dangerous case of
anthropomorphism. He says at one point, almost solipsistically, that “[w]e cannot reliably infer
pain sensations from non-verbal behavior even in human beings” (117). But Kennedy never
explains how or why anthropomorphism is dangerous. At best, he alludes to it being a “blind
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prejudice” (160), “uncritical” (153), and “delusional” (5), but at the same time accepts the fact
that there is explanatory and predictive value to science that operates under the assumption that
animals do in fact suffer and are conscious: “It has presumably also been ‘pre-programed’ into
our hereditary make-up by natural selection, perhaps because it proved to be useful for predicting
and controlling the behavior of animals. It is therefore useful, incidentally, in scientific research
on the adaptiveness of their behavior” (Kennedy 5). In his book, Kennedy makes two claims that
are contradictory. If attributing such mental states to animals is explanatorily and predictably
successful, then the burden of proof ought to be on Kennedy to show why such attributions are
bad for science. Degrazia writes that “[i]t might be argued that the fact that animals behave as if
they have desires is not evidence that they really do have desires […but this position is]
mistaken” (Degrazia 132). His argument, following a similar argument produced by Jerry Fodor,
is that the best explanation of animal behavior is that they really do have desires. In other words,
scientists have a lot more work cut out for them to show that animals only behave as if they have
desires. Putting the burden of proof in the right direction, Degrazia argues that granting desires to
animals is not a case of anthropomorphism; it’s just good science! He emphasizes that if skeptics
worry too much about attributing any content to animal’s mental states, then we “lose much
explanatory and predictive power regarding animal behavior” (157). Degrazia’s response to the
skeptic is a common and broadly accepted response in philosophy of science. In absence of ‘hard
proof’ or ‘direct observables,’ inferences to the best explanation are perfectly acceptable. The
alternative, the belief that anything unobservable cannot be accepted in science, seems a bad
position to take, else we would have to reject a host of assumptions in science, e.g., the existence
of electrons and Darwin’s theory of evolution. But the theory of quantum mechanics and
Darwin’s theory is good science, offering a plethora of explanatory and predictive success. The
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skeptic’s demand for hard proof or direct observables of animal mentation thus reduces to absurd
conclusions for science.
In addition, if we are to take the skeptic’s position seriously, it is fair to ask what the
skeptic has to offer as an alternative explanation of animal behavior. In other words, if the
skeptic wishes to convince us that anthropomorphism is bad science, the burden of proof is on
her to show why we should assume the alternative. But the skeptic’s alternative explanation is
vacuous and unhelpful. If we were to rid ourselves of anthropomorphism completely, we would
only replace the attribution of human mental states to animals with another “morphism.” For
instance, Eileen Crist and Frans de Waal call “mechanomorphism” a type of “morphism” where
we attribute to non-human beings a mechanistic explanation of their behavior rather than a
psycho-centric one. But other such “morphisms” lack the benefit of the simplest explanation and
they do not offer much predictive power (Karlsson 711). Frankly, it is naïve to think that animals
are more similar to robots than to people. Erica Fudge has pushed this point even further, saying
that mechanomorphism is still anthropo-morphism! “Not only can we never really know what a
pet feels because it is an animal, but also any terms that we might construct to define animal
actions that avoided humanization would still be human terms. We cannot get away from
ourselves.” (my emphasis, 59). Mechanomorphism is neither more helpful nor more ‘objective.’
Thus, in absence of good reasons for an alternative explanation of animal behavior in other than
psychological terms, we can safely say that psychological anthropomorphism is not bad science.
The second claim—the claim that anthropomorphism is bad for science—is a normative
one. In other words, it implies that something in science is at stake or is threatened by
anthropomorphism. The argument goes that the consequence of anthropomorphism is that
science will be held back or limited in some way. But as I mentioned just previously, this
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limitation cannot be in terms of the scientific virtues of explanation or prediction. The limitation
must be for other anthropocentric reasons, such as the use of animals in laboratory research.
Remember, what was shown above was that it is good science to attribute such states to animals,
and it is bad science to take the alternative position. This means that on moral grounds, we
cannot do to animals what we have done to animals in the name of science in the past (e.g.,
vivisections, cosmetic and pharmaceutical testing, etc.). If anthropomorphism is bad for science,
then it must be in the sense that we cannot do to them whatever we please, and this significantly
limits science. But Marc Bekoff makes a persuasive normative argument in favor of animal
interests. His argument models the argument made in the seventeenth century by French
philosopher and mathematician Blaise Pascal. A very rough representation of Pascal’s argument
goes something like this: it is possible that God actually does exist. From what we can know, it is
just as possible that God does not exist. In absence of hard proof, if we believe that God exists,
either our belief is true and we reap an eternal reward or it is false and we still lead a good life.
Now, if we believe that God does not exist, there are two further possible outcomes: either our
belief is true, but we gain nothing, or our belief is false and we suffer infinitely in hell.
Therefore, if we are to gamble with our souls, then in the absence of hard proof the best bet is to
believe that God exists. Bekoff offers a similar argument. I’ll call it Bekoff’s Wager:
(1) It is possible that all animals experience pain and suffering. This possibility is
increasingly reflected by scientific evidence.
(2) Science is not harmed if we assume that animals feel pain.
(3) However, if we do not grant that animals have such mental experiences, it is very
possible that they will continue to suffer greatly.
(4) Thus since there is more at stake for animals than for science, we need a paradigm shift
in science that favors the assumption that all animals (even those that are alien to humans
physiologically) experience mental phenomena (Bekoff, my paraphrase, 22-23).
This shift requires a rejection of previous skeptical assumptions about animal cognition, shifting
the burden of proof of complex animal emotions from the animals themselves onto the skeptics
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to show that indeed they do not have such capacities. He says that “such an assumption
increasingly reflects the evidence [that all animals have the capacity to suffer]” citing Ian
Duncan’s research that shows that fish experience pain and fear, and Donald Broom’s hypothesis
that for animals with less complex brains, they may lack the capacity to deal as effectively with
pain than animals with more complex brains, concluding that less cognitively complex animals
such as fish may actually suffer more! (22). Thus, the argument that anthropomorphism is bad
for science holds no weight. The argument does not rest on the integrity of science, but on the
human-centered consequences for science, such as the benefit of using animals in research. Such
a view totally fails to consider those beings that are most at stake—the animals.
At this point I have shown that anthropomorphism is neither bad science nor bad for
science. In fact, I’ve shown that attributing mental states to animals does quite the opposite. It is
the best explanation we have of animal behavior. In addition, in normative terms, it appropriately
frames the ethical space of what we can do to animals. It assumes that animals are subjects and
thus are also moral stakeholders as moral patients and subjects, and the positive consequences of
this assumption far outweigh the alleged anthropocentric benefits to science under the alternative
view that posits animals as mere automata.

Implications for End-of-Life Ethics
Held’s point that caregiving requires both a knowledge base and a caring disposition
ought to be revisited. In an end-of-life or hospice context for animals, what’s at stake is their
welfare and quality-of-life when they age, fall ill, and die. We know that animals suffer when
they age, fall ill, and die, and the field of veterinary medicine in part has been established to
alleviate the physical suffering of animals and to keep them healthy as best we can for as long as
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we can. However, if animals can experience complex emotions, as Bekoff shows, then we ought
to try to care for their psychological as well as physical welfare. In other words, if animals have
been shown in science to exhibit compassion and empathy, it may be arrogant to assume that
they do not experience complex emptions like embarrassment, shame, and depression that are
more relevantly end-of-life emotions. If there is sufficient reason to believe that animals have
such complex emotions that center on illness, aging, death, and dying, then this in turn affects the
degree to which we ought to care for them.
The first immediate problem with this is that there is a lack of evidence that animals
experience such complex end-of-life emotions. We ought to look for “as if” behavioral evidence
that can show this. Cognitive ethologists ought to work with veterinarians to research whether
such behavioral evidence exists. Bioethicists S.B. Christiansen and B. Forkman have recently
argued that current quality of life scales used by human caregivers and veterinarians are crude
welfare assessments of animals. They call for ethologists to address the ambiguities I have
mentioned (e.g. possible psychological suffering due to experiences with illness, age, and dying)
that are not adequately addressed in quality of life scales. “Seen from an ethological point of
view,” they say, “most studies are lacking sufficient broadness and detail in the parameters used
to provide a basis for animal welfare assessments beyond a clinical evaluation” (Christiansen and
Forkman 2). The suggestion here is that the term “welfare” covers more than just “health.” As
veterinarians are concerned with “health” and not “welfare” primarily, ethologists are needed in
order to better develop a conception of “welfare.” For example, they argue that follow-up studies
of leg amputations in dogs are necessary for a thorough assessment of the dog’s overall welfare.
Though the dog may heal with no physical complications, other aspects of the dog’s quality of
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life require assessment, such as the changes in social behavior of the dog in relation to other dogs
(ibid 3). Christiansen and Forkman cite studies, e.g., that showed that
behavior can change in dogs following limb amputation […suggesting] that a change in
functional status may result in a lower position in the rank order when interacting with
other dogs. [The researchers] could not, however, determine the reason for the changes
observed, and it is likely that ethologists would be able to contribute to further research
on this matter (ibid 23).
In short, Christiansen and Forkman argue that we need to get clear on what we mean by “quality
of life,” and we need a way of assessing “quality of life” that allows for a reflection of a more
nuanced interpretation of animal behavior and psychological states. Animal welfare assessments
ought to be complex and nuanced, not crude. Veterinarians ought to look to ethology to gain
beneficial knowledge about animal welfare and to avoid the risk of missing signs of poor welfare
(ibid 15-16). This requires a holistic understanding of the social and emotional as well as
physical side-effects and complications of medical procedures. Christiansen and Forkman worry
that an emphasis of physical health over behavioral and mental aspects (possibly due to lack of
knowledge) puts animal welfare assessments at the risk of being incomplete. Ethological
research and perspective would help both to enrich a welfare assessment and to maintain a higher
degree of objectivity in such assessments (ibid 17-18).
Following Christiansen and Forkman, I would also like to challenge applied ethologists
to consider investigating whether companion animal behavior indicates any sort of psychological
experiences of suffering due to aging, illness, death, dying, embarrassment, or shame, as these
seem to be mental experiences that are relevant to creating a more robust animal welfare
assessment in an end-of-life context.
For now, though, this chapter has shown that we can say that animals have beliefs,
concepts, desires, and preferences about comfort, security, peace, what makes them happy,
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anxious, unhappy, etc. Such cognitive functions are also relevant in an end-of-life context. In
addition, in absence of data, maybe we ought still to assume that animals do in fact experience
such forms of complex psychological anxiety and suffering. Bekoff’s Wager shows this. We
ought to at least consider the possibility that animals do experience specific complex emotions
such as embarrassment, pride, shame, depression, sadness, grief, etc. because this assumption
enriches the way that we can care for them when they age or fall ill. Such assumptions may only
slightly burden us, because they require a higher degree of attunement and sensitivity to our
companion animals. But the consequences of assuming otherwise seem more troubling.
Specifically, we may neglect the psychological welfare of animals if we require “hard proof” of
such complex emptions. I think it very likely that science will show that animals experience such
complex psychological phenomena that are relevant to death and dying, but my position, for
now, stands that in absence of data, we ought to err on the side of animals. Such projection of
these mental states to animals cannot harm the animals. In fact, it should enrich the way that we
care for them.
In short, now that the assumption that animals have robust mental experiences has been
given more justification, we can then turn to science and philosophy to give content and direction
to end-of-life caregiving for animals whilst operating under the moral framework of an ethics of
care. Care ethics must rely on cognitive ethology and moral psychology in an end-of-life
caregiving context because science may be able to tell us something about the content of animal
beliefs that are particular to such a context. This knowledge would have significant practical
import to ways of measuring the happiness and well-being of the animal patient in such cases,
especially in quality-of-life scales, for example. In turn, this knowledge would inevitably affect
the way we care for the animals that we love.
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CHAPTER THREE
CARE AND COMPANIONSHIP: AN ALTERNATIVE ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ANIMALS

The last chapter showed that there are good pragmatic reasons for assuming animals are
conscious and capable of having complex mental experiences. It also discussed the basic ways
we can attribute mental content to animals, and it concluded with the implications it has for endof-life caregiving. Specifically, if animals have emotional as well as physical needs, this makes a
difference in how we ought to care for them. Here, I will finally explain what it means to be a
true companion in human-animal relations, and why this is morally relevant in an end-of-life
care context. Though the interests of companion animals have been relatively absent from the
discourse in care ethics, I will argue that such an inclusion is important. I will then set out what
an animal care ethic would look like, namely, through a more detailed articulation of the
companionism model. Finally, in the next chapter, I will show how an animal care ethic would
work in practice in an end-of-life context.

Care Ethics (An Overview)
Care ethics is a fairly new field of ethics that began in the 1980s. The care tradition is a
response to the justice tradition in ethics. Specifically, care ethics grounds ethics in the particular
and contextual rather than in universal and abstract principles. Carol Gilligan in In A Different
Voice (1982) first argued that there are two different ways of moral thought. One is based on
abstract and universal principles and the other based on intimate and particular relations. Under
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, women’s moral thinking was classified the same as
children’s moral thinking. Kohlberg’s “discovery” was that women, in interviews, when asked to
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determine right action from a hypothetical moral dilemma, did not derive right action from
universal and abstract moral principles, and thus were not as morally developed as men. In her
book, Gilligan suggests that Kohlberg’s conclusion is due to a bias towards masculine thinking
in terms of justice and rights and a general lack of the feminine voice in moral discourse.
Gilligan writes, “this ethic, which reflects a cumulative knowledge of human
relationships, revolves around a central insight, that self and other are interdependent” (74).
Feminine moral thinking, according to Gilligan, is relational and interdependent, rather than
abstract and independent. Gilligan discusses the differences in masculine and feminine moral
thought as such:
Women’s construction of the moral problem as a problem of care and responsibility in
relationships rather than as one of rights and rules ties the development of their moral
thinking to changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the
conception of morality as justice ties development to the logic of equality and reciprocity.
Thus the logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic of relationships, which
contrast with the formal logic of fairness that informs the justice approach (73).
Thus, Gilligan’s research suggests that the feminine construction of moral problems—seeing
moral dilemmas in terms of conflicting responsibilities (105)—is a framing that ought to be
taken seriously as a different voice. Masculine thinking is not hierarchically better than feminine
thinking, as Kohlberg had suggested, or vice-versa. But until Gilligan’s novel research, this
different voice was not heard in realm of ethics and moral development.
Gilligan’s research also showed that feminine moral thinking was not done in the
abstract. Though masculine moral thought privileged reasoning in abstraction through
hypothetical thought experiments, women found that framing moral problems in such
abstractions made it very difficult to determine right action. For women, the concrete and
contextual particulars of moral problems were vibrantly significant to every ethical dilemma. On
this, Gilligan highlights the problem of abstract thought-experiments, saying,
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Hypothetical dilemmas, in the abstraction of their presentation, divest moral actors from
the history and psychology of their individual lives and separate the moral problem from
the social contingencies of its possible occurrence.
Gilligan goes on to say that the concrete and contextual particulars of moral problems are
important in feminine moral reasoning because it engages feelings of compassion and tolerance.
She writes that
[o]nly when substance is given to the skeletal lives of hypothetical people is it possible to
consider the social injustice that their moral problems may reflect and to imagine the
individual suffering their occurrence may signify or their resolution engender.
Thus, feminine moral reasoning is distinct from masculine moral reasoning.
The proclivity of women to reconstruct hypothetical dilemmas in terms of the real, to
request or to supply missing information about the nature of the people and the places
where they live, shifts their judgment away from the hierarchical ordering of principles
and the formal procedures of decision making (Gilligan, 100).
The masculine “skeletal” rendering of moral problems simply in terms of hypothetical thought
experiments flattens morally important particulars and it justifies the ranking of duties against
each other. Such flattening is representative of the moral systems of justice and rights. A
hierarchical ranking of principles creates the illusion that right action is derivable from the
abstract and the general.
Since Gilligan’s work on feminine psychological development, many feminist
philosophers have developed an ethic of care as an alternative moral framework to the tradition
of rights and justice. Today, care ethicists stress that caring emotions are vital for ethics, such as
compassion, empathy, love, and friendship. Care ethicists argue that although thinkers in the
rights and justice tradition polarize reason and emotion in favor of reason (Slicer 1991, 113),
“ethics begins at the emotional level, with the desire to be a good person, rather than at the
intellectual level, with an analysis of the concept of ‘goodness.’” (Tong 109). Feminist
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epistemologist Allison Jaggar argues that emotions are a way of knowing. Emotions are not
separate from reason, but rather, emotions as well as reason can bring us closer to the truth
(Jaggar 1989).
The emphasis on relationship described just earlier leads to a skeptical view on the part of
the care tradition of liberal individualism and the common conception of autonomy. Care
ethicists critique liberal individualism because of the way that such a position characterizes
persons. Persons, under the liberal model, are autonomous and distinct individuals primarily, and
then persons in relationships secondarily. In other words, we are distinct individuals before we
form relationships according to the liberal model. Under an ethics of care, the conception of the
person is quite different. While the Kantian legacy views persons as purely autonomous and
rational law-givers, under an ethic of care, persons are relational and interdependent, rather than
detached and independent. Care ethicists argue that humans do not sprout up from nowhere, and
the degree of autonomy that individuals have depends on their relationships with people, history,
and social contexts. It draws attention to the “material, psychological, and social prerequisites
for autonomy” (Held 84). Regarding the dangers of liberal individualism and the Kantian
tradition, Virginia Held argues that the assumptions of individualism contribute to a pervasive
attitude of indifference to the welfare of others (83). She writes that although the liberal view
purports to promote justice, “[i]t promotes only calculated self-interest and moral indifference in
place of the caring and concern that citizens often have for fellow citizens” (ibid).
Held writes that in contrast to liberal individualism, an ethics of care is “hospitable to the
relatedness of persons. It sees many of our responsibilities as not freely entered into but
presented to us by the accidents of our embeddedness in familial and social and historical
contexts” (14). Care ethicists recognize that relations are not made contractually, or even always
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voluntarily. This ethic does have a conception of autonomy, but it is relational. In other words,
unlike the liberal conception, we give ourselves laws already embedded in a web of relations.
Held calls this autonomy “mutual autonomy” where selfhood and identity are shaped by social
factors such as race, class, gender, ethnicity, family, and community (48, 55). In this way, care
ethics accounts for a more realistic conception of person and moral relations, as it does not
obscure away the influence of complex relations on our identity and our options and decisions.
This alternative conception of persons and autonomy in terms of interdependent relations
encourages caring relations with members of our community.
In addition, through conceiving of responsibility through a web of relations, care ethicists
recognize that all people depend on others and they in turn depend on us for love, friendship, and
emotional support as well as for meeting basic physical and material needs. In fact, everyone is
born into the world dependent on others and we often leave this world in great need of the care
of others. If we recognize persons as embedded in dependency relations, then this will serve
much better for ethics, especially through prescriptions of caregiving obligations. Since no
human individuals are detached moral agents throughout the entirety of our lives, we ought to
have an ethic that can take seriously such dependency relations. Eva Kittay writes that,
However a society is organized, a significant number of persons will be in [a
dependency] condition. From that starting place we can then contemplate the
requirements of those whose neediness diverges, in extent and kind, from this paradigm.
The strategy is intended as a rejoinder to that of idealizing theories of justice as does
Rawls, wherein the paradigm case is the fully functioning adult (241).
Care ethics and dependency relationships demand more from us politically than our society
recognizes. Kittay argues that our society pathologizes dependency rather than accepting it as a
“normal part of human life” (244). An example of where such pathologizing takes place is the
welfare service. Rather than society recognizing our responsibility to meet general social needs
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of those least advantaged, the welfare service is pathologized as a system that encourages people
to depend on the state rather than to take care of themselves. Kittay says we need to recognize
that dependency is not something to fear and loathe. We must recognize that dependency is
species-typical (248).

The Absence of Companion Animals in Ethics
Regarding dependency relations, care ethics has centered on caregiving for dependent
human others. Though care ethics is a fairly new field of moral philosophy that has focused on
particular ethical encounters with humans, I believe that this new framework best addresses the
complexity of moral problems that arise in the home with the animals we love. As was shown
above, care ethics as a theory reveals that traditional moral theories have their limits, though
most such theories claim to be universal and capable of dealing with every moral problem.
Specifically, animal ethicists working under the traditional frameworks of deontology and
utilitarianism do not get past talk of basic rights, duties, and responsibilities to animals. For
example, Regan argues that we ought never to infringe on the inherent rights of living beings that
are experiencing subjects of a life, and Singer argues that we ought to not inflict unnecessary
suffering onto sentient beings. Care ethics enriches the ethical discussion past talk of egalitarian,
universal rights towards a more nuanced ethic.
Though many care ethicists have concerned themselves with animal ethics generally, e.g.,
Carol J. Adams, Marti Kheel, and Josephine Donovan, to name a few, not much has been written
about our moral obligations to companion animals specifically. Though not a care ethicist, Keith
Burgess-Jackson, in 1998, wrote what I think was the first real defense of the ethical treatment of
companion animals, rather than all animals generally. He laments that philosophical literature on
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the subject of companion animals contains a “glaring omission” (159). He blames this omission
on the dominant tendency in ethics to be impartial. The animal ethics of Singer and Regan
indeed purport an egalitarian view of animal rights and welfare. However, Burgess-Jackson
argues that just as we recognize that there exists special responsibilities to particular humans
(e.g., children), so too do we have responsibilities to the animals who we willingly take in to live
in our homes (ibid). He writes that, “[d]epending on the species, we sleep with them, recreate
with them, travel with them, care for them, play with them, teach them, learn from them, and in
general consider their companionship a part of the good life” (160). For the most part, for many
people, our lives are highly interwoven with the lives of animals.
Though Burgess-Jackson is not a care ethicist, he uses the language of care to articulate
our moral obligations to companion animals. He says, “[T]he act of bringing an animal into
one’s life—the act of forming a bond or relationship with a particular sentient being—generates
a responsibility to care for its needs” (my emphases, 163). Burgess-Jackson also argues that our
obligations to animal others do not arise out of contracts; rather, they arise through the particular
relationship between humans and companion animals. This is a key tie to the care tradition,
which maintains that particular relations, rather than abstract principles, give rise to moral
obligations. Bringing an animal into our homes and our lives creates a particular and noncontractual relationship that nevertheless demands of us certain moral responsibilities. BurgessJackson argues that such responsibilities stem from the fact that one’s decision to bring an
animal into his or her home determines the future course of the animal’s life (168-9). The
animal’s future welfare depends on the quality of the care that one chooses to provide. BurgessJackson’s recognition of obligations to animals due to this web of dependency relations between
humans and companion animals then clears a path for an animal care ethic.
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In addition, Clare Palmer has argued, in Rethinking Animal Ethics in Appropriate
Context (2007), that the egalitarian ethics of Singer and Regan that treats all animal interests
equally is problematic because it cannot make sense of how to prioritize attending to endangered
species or companion animals. In other words, an impartial and egalitarian animal ethic falls
short because it ignores context. She argues that the particular historical context by which wild
animals are either put in danger of extinction by humans or domesticated by humans demands
heavier moral consideration of them. She writes that animal ethics ought to take into account
animals shaped and formed by human actions in terms of genetic make-up, susceptibility
to disease, reproductive capacity, bodily form, temperament and cognitive abilities.
Focusing on capacities such as the ability to feel pain alone cannot, in particular, capture
anything about the dramatic transformation in animals wrought by domestication. From a
philosophical animal liberation perspective there is nothing of direct ethical interest to be
said either about human intervention in the processes of bringing into being, selectively
breeding and shaping the natures of domesticated animals; or about the human
independent, ecological embeddedness of wild animals (Palmer 2007, 3).
For Palmer, an animal ethic ought to factor how an animal stands in relation to human culture.
Some animals—namely, companion animals—have been domesticated into human culture.
Because of this history of domestication, such animals depend on humans for survival. She
argues that “the creation of domesticates is the deliberate creation of dependence” (11). Because
humans and animals have cohabitated for tens of thousands of years, and because historically, we
had a direct role in the creation of animal dependency, we need an ethic that acknowledges
morally relevant differences between domestic and wild animals.

Differences and Similarities between Human and Animal Relations
Some might argue that equating caring relationships with human with caring relations
with animals could blur or flatten a lot of significant differences between humans and animals.
Here I do not attempt to conflate the distinct relationships that occur between members of the
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same species and inter-species relationships. To be clear, human romantic, sisterly, and maternal
caring relations are unique and differ from the relations we have with animal companions. Thus,
while I want to use care ethics as a framework for end-of-life animal caregiving, it is important
to recognize that there are differences between caring for a human and caring for an animal.
There is the obvious difference of species. Clearly, the needs of a human are going to differ
somewhat from the needs of an animal. For example, fostering an appreciation for learning
mathematics, music theory, or literature, in a child is a way to care for a child that would not
make sense for an animal. But there are ways that caring for children and companion animals can
overlap. For instance, caring enough to attend a child’s piano recital is not the same but is akin to
caring enough to take one’s dog on a walk if he’s been without exercise for much of the day.
Burgess-Jackson says that though not every human need is a dog need,
dogs, like humans, have a variety of psychic and social needs (although these tend to be
ignored). Dogs need the sort of stimulations that humans refer to as attention,
entertainment, or recreation. Dogs need to be rubbed, scratched, petted, and hugged
(forms of tactile stimulation); they need to be engaged in various forms of play
(structured or unstructured) with their human companions; they need to develop and use
their senses; and most importantly, they need to interact with other dogs. Dogs are social
beings. They are no less social than humans are, and while it is possible for a human or a
dog to survive without interaction (think of a human being in solitary confinement), no
human would count it an adequate existence, let alone a fulfilled one (180-81).
The particular ways to care for another being are going to be different for different species.
Further, ways of caring are going to be different for each particular individual within the species,
be it canine or human, for example. Though the particular relations humans have with each other
are unique to the relations humans can have with animals, in some ways they are also related.
Thus, in regard to caring relations and responsibilities, I am interested here in where the needs of
humans and the needs of animals overlap. This overlap should be taken seriously because
companion animals are inherently dependents. They are also our intimate friends. We confide in
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them. We rely on them for companionship. On this overlap, ethologist Marc Bekoff writes of
animals that
[t]heir joy is the purest and most contagious of joys and their grief the deepest and most
devastating. Their passions bring us to our knees in delight and sorrow. If animals didn’t
show their feelings, it’s unlikely that people would bond with them. We form close
relationships with our pets not only because of our own emotional needs but also because
of our recognition of theirs (my emphasis, 19).
He argues further that being compassionate to the needs of an animal overlaps with a general
caring disposition for all emotive beings.9 Because animals and humans are sensitive to each
other’s emotions reciprocally, this overlap is morally relevant. Animals, attuned to our emotions,
care for us as companions. In recognition of their emotional needs, we ought to do the same for
them.

The Problem of Projection Revisited
In the last chapter, the problem of projection was analyzed briefly. Here I will show that
the approach to animal ethics working in the justice tradition—namely, the approach of Peter
Singer and Tom Regan—does not avoid the problem of projection. I’ll argue that although the
care alternative does not fully rid us of the problem of projection, it best avoids it.
The traditional “Singer-Regan approach”10 to animal ethics is guilty of “cultural
anthropomorphism,” in the sense that they take a social construction—namely a “western”
human notion of moral value—and use it as a basis for measuring the moral worth of animals
(Karlsson 713-15). The “western” human normative system bases moral value in psychological
9

Though I believe that what Bekoff says here is true, to avoid confusion it is important to distinguish his point from
Kant’s argument for indirect duties towards animals. Kant argued that animals only have moral worth insofar as
being kind to them inclines us to treat humans better. However Bekoff is saying something different. Animals merit
moral consideration for their own sake. Bekoff’s idea here is that both humans and animals have the capacity to be
sensitive to each other’s emotional needs. Animals are not merely tools (means to ends) for the cultivation of moral
sensitivity, as Kant argues. Rather, two species—human and animal—can be sensitive to the needs of each other in
an intimate way, and such intimate sensitivities can expand outward to caring for more distant others.
10
This is a term developed by Deborah Slicer in “Your Daughter or Your Dog?” Hypatia, 1991.
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experiences. It measures animals according to a metric of ‘sameness.’ In other words, this
approach values animals based on a ‘lowest common denominator’ of sameness, valuing animals
either because they are ‘sentient beings’ or because they are ‘experiencing subjects of a life.’
Both sentience and subjective experiences are human experiences that matter morally and they
are significant to animal ethics because most animals happen to share them. Thus, only insofar as
they share similar psychological experiences to us do animals matter morally. In addition, under
Singer and Regan’s moral extentionist theories, though they push for an egalitarian treatment of
animals, exceptions to their equal treatment are made in “life-boat” cases. In such cases, human
psychological experiences are ranked as better or more morally valuable because they are more
complex in terms of rationality and because humans experience more ‘sophisticated’ feelings of
suffering. The problem with their approach is that when we compare human psychological
experiences as normatively superior to equine experiences, for example, we transfer a human
cultural notion onto horses; we treat horses like human horses rather than what they are, horses!
It is anthropocentric to give normative emphasis to the extent that animal experiences match up
to human experiences, though Singer and Regan claim that their ethic is non-anthropocentric.
Singer and Regan, though both say that their ethic is non-anthropocentric and egalitarian,
essentially project a human value theory onto animals. Singer and Regan both have an account
for why human suffering or harm is worse than animal suffering or harm. Both arguments stem
from the same root—that human psychological experiences, because they are more complex, are
then more valuable. When we mistake traits that humans excel at, e.g., moral reasoning, to be the
measure of what traits should be cherished in other non-human beings, we are projecting. The
danger of projecting a human value-system based on sameness onto animals is that it fails to see
animals as animals. When we do this, we more easily conflate our feelings and interests with our
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animals’. We need an ethical framework that can account for the particulars of individuals, both
human and nonhuman.

Projection and Arrogant Perception
Care ethics as a moral framework more critically avoids the problem of projection than
traditional animal ethics for many reasons. First, it does not attempt to do ethics from a “view
from nowhere.” 11 Care ethics explicitly values the complex and particular differences of
individuals. Under an ethics of care, individuals are more than just sentient rights-bearers. As I
will show, care ethics is thus a step forward from the “top-down” ethic of Singer and Regan
where ‘right action’ in any context is derived from abstract universal principles. The care
approach allows us to more richly articulate what our responsibilities are to our particular
animal. Thus, care ethics is critical because it sees animals as individual animals, not furry
people.
Secondly, care ethics critically avoids projection because it is reflective—it takes extra
care to avoid the projection of a subject’s own interests and value systems onto another being. A
caring person is aware of the problem of projection, whereas those that operate under traditional
justice-based ethical frameworks are unaware that their theory rests on anthropocentric
assumptions of value. A caring person acknowledges that interpreting another’s preference and
welfare interests is an ongoing process of educated guessing, and it is possible that we could be
wrong. A caring person, to avoid interpreting another’s interests wrongly, will attune themselves
to the other in order to be able to accurately interpret their expression of needs. This is a
sensitivity that is not articulated in the “Singer-Regan approach.”
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Feminist philosopher Marilyn Frye has articulated two ways humans can perceive the
world—either arrogantly or lovingly. ‘Arrogant eyes’ organize everything they see “with
references to themselves and their own interests. [….] The arrogant perceiver does not
countenance the possibility that the Other is independent, indifferent” (Frye, 67). Frye argues
then that arrogant perception of this kind also produces expectations of behavior and “[t]he
arrogant perceiver’s expectation creates in the space about him a sort of vacuum mold into which
the other is sucked and held” (ibid 69). And finally, if the other acts counter to the arrogant
perceiver’s expectations, “[t]o the extent that he notices this incongruity, he can experience it in
no other way than as something wrong with her” (ibid). The philosophy of the arrogant perceiver
purports that literally everything can be understood by human intelligence, reason, and
understanding and that everything can be reduced to the simplest of explanations (71). Frye
argues that this arrogant way of perceiving the world has contributed to oppression and harm to
women,12 and that an alternative form of perception, the loving eye, avoids such oppression.
Philosophers Tom Tyler and Deborah Slicer illustrate the problem of arrogant perception in
animal ethics. First, Tyler writes that
Anthropocentrism is a kind of species narcissism, an obsessive love of self. Just as the
narcissist is self-absorbed, self-centered, so the anthropocentrist is species-centered
(‘anthropo-centric’). Anthropocentrists, like Narcissus, have eyes only for themselves.
This ‘first and foremost’ anthropocentrism, this species narcissism, which is evident far
too often in philosophy and contemporary critical thinking, is the foundation on which
the notion of anthropomorphism rests, and is in turn sustained by its continuing
invocation (Tyler 23).
Slicer writes that Singer and Regan fail to recognize important differences between humans and
animals. On Singer and Regan’s focus on sameness, Slicer writes that “[t]his sort of self-centric
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For example, Frye argues in the same text that Western Civilization has understood man’s place in nature as an
exploiter of resources be it human (e.g. women) and nonhuman (66-67). She argues that the picture of women was
as servants, and if a woman did not serve man, it was either because there was something wrong with her, or there
the man was not a skilled enough master.
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‘fusion into one’ and the ‘erasure of difference’ […] is central to the concept of arrogance”
(109). Thus, the way that philosophy has framed a discussion of the relative moral worth of
animals and humans has been under a lens of the arrogant eye, only viewing animals as morally
valuable so long as they “measure up” to our ways of valuing.
For example, consider how Singer and Regan justify harming an animal in the “life-boat”
thought experiments where (very hypothetically) either a human or a dog has to jump ship if one
is to survive. Recall Gilligan’s concerns for reducing the complexity of moral problems into
hypothetical dilemmas. Gilligan warns that such abstractions divest the subject from the
historical and social context and psychology that constitutes her individual life. “Life-boat”
thought experiments abstract away important relational and contextual nuances and call us to
focus on making ethical decisions based on a hierarchical ranking of psychological experiences
generally. Specifically, “life-boat” conclusions stem from an initial belief that non-human beings
are less cognitively developed or sophisticated than “us” human beings. Under such a belief,
their ‘difference’ is only understood in terms of sameness—animal experiences are not exactly
the same as ours, and that’s why they’re not as valuable. The assumption is that humans engage
in relationships, imagination, planning for the future, and have a sense of identity to a greater
extent than animals do. Thus, if hypothetically we have to make decisions about what life to
save—either human or animal—then the human’s interests always trump the animals’. This
solution to the hypothetical ‘life-boat’ dilemma justifies an anthropocentric, hierarchical valuemetric that measures humans at the apex. But the problem with this simple thought experiment is
that it fails to see the distinct separateness and unique individuality of non-human beings; it only
measures the worth of non-humans in terms of how they measure up (or fail to measure up) to
humans. In addition, “[Singer and Regan’s] atemporal, abstract, and acontextual
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characterizations of issues, of the values at stake, and of appropriate resolutions, grossly
oversimplify […] highly complex issues” (my emphasis, Slicer 113). This traditional approach to
animal ethics assumes that making decisions on behalf of the welfare of other animals is a
simple, rather than a messy and complex moral undertaking—it assumes that choosing, for
example, between your life and a dog’s life can be reduced to a simple abstraction.

Loving Perception
The loving eye, by contrast, is neither selfish (like the arrogant eye) nor selfless. What’s
important here is that the loving perceiver does not assume that her interests and the other’s
interests are the same; they are distinct:
The loving eye knows the independence of the other. It is the eye of a seer who knows
that nature is indifferent. It is the eye of one who knows that to know the seen, one must
consult something other than one’s own will and interests and fears and imagination. One
must look at the thing. One must look and listen and check and question.
Frye goes on to say,
The loving eye is one that pays a certain sort of attention. This attention can require a
discipline but not a self-denial. The discipline is one of self-knowledge, knowledge of
the scope and boundaries of the self. What is required is that one know what are one’s
interests, desires and loathings, one’s projects, hungers, fears and wishes, and that one
know what is and what is not determined by these. In particular, it is a matter of being
able to tell one’s own interests from those of others and of knowing where one’s self
leaves off and another begins (Frye 75).
Frye’s distinction between two ways of perceiving the world—through an arrogant or loving
lens—relates to the problem of projection and the solution to the problem, respectively. Frye’s
“loving perception” is a critical way of making sense of the world because it allows for a
perception of the other (in this case non-humans) as distinctly separate from the perceiver. This
implies that the perceiver’s normative set, or way of organizing her world, is not the same as the
other’s (the non-human’s) way of organizing his or her world. Consequently, the perceiver
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knows that the other’s interests should not be judged on the basis of her interests. Frye writes that
the loving eye requires the discipline of the perceiver to identify and claim when she wants the
other’s interests to fit with hers, rather than to assume that they do (75). This requires that to
really know the other, the perceiver must attend to the other’s needs. Frye qualifies here that this
requires discipline, not self-denial (ibid).

Companionism
Companionism, as I will now show, is an animal care ethic that is specific to companion
animals. A framework of companionism necessitates the following things: first, it requires
perceiving the animal other with a loving rather than arrogant eye. This requires a recognition
and celebration of animal difference. Second, we must recognize the particular moral demands
companion animals have on us due to the intimate bond and relationship we share with them.
The human-companion animal bond is often much stronger than any fellow-feeling we may have
towards dairy cows, for instance. Third, we must be sensitive and attuned to the needs of animal
companions. Caring attention requires more than an understanding of obligations due. It requires
also deep feelings of compassion, friendship, empathy, etc. In an end-of-life context, caring
attention also requires adapting to an animal’s evolving needs when the going gets tough.
Finally, companionism necessitates the development of a basis of understanding of the animal
other. Knowledge about their differing needs can be drawn from ethological science,
veterinarians, and through our own experiences with animals over time.

1.

Following Frye, first and foremost, we ought to perceive our companion animals with a

loving eye. This means that one must see the animal other as a distinct separate individual with
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its own preferences and interests. The human perceiver must never unreflectively assume that
just because he or she feels, desires, or prefers something, the animal subject must in turn feel,
desire, or prefer the same thing. The only way to truly and accurately attend to the needs of
another is to recognize that their needs are distinctly unique and separate from one’s own. Erica
Fudge implicitly applies the methodology of the loving eye to address the issue of projection.
She says that “[t]o read doggish is to open up the possibility of communication with another
species that is not flattening out difference but celebrating it” (my emphasis, 64). On animal
difference, Slicer also argues that “[t]here is no reason why animals’ differences […] cannot be
grounds for caring, for relationships characterized by such ethically significant attitudes as
respect, gratitude, compassion, fellow or sisterly feeling, and wonder” (Slicer 110). Thus, though
we cannot completely get out of a human perspective of caregiving, by perceiving an animal
other through a loving eye, not an arrogant eye, and by valuing difference, we will best avoid the
problem of projection in an end-of-life care context. If we wish to really give the best care to our
companion animals when they fall ill, we must see them as separate subjects, rather than objects
or “lesser” subjects, and must recognize and celebrate their differences from us.
Fudge discusses how if we do not try to understand the meaning of ‘dog language,’ we
can harm our companion animals and they can harm us. Consider a dog’s ‘smile.’ If a dog is
showing her teeth in annoyance, and we show our teeth back, we may reinforce aggressive
behavior by mistaking it as human-like, “friendly” behavior. If we do not attend to animals as
animals but only perceive them arrogantly, or as furry humans, negative results like biting and
possibly subsequent euthanasia of the animal could occur. Human language, even body language
(a smile) “is not the only language in the world” (Fudge 54). Fudge says that carelessly
misinterpreting a dog’s smile is a case of bad anthropomorphism. She says that such
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misinterpretations “blank out difference and transform the world into the human” (56). Indeed,
my companion animal is not me, it is not a human, and it is an individual within its species, with
a specific demeanor and personality.
2.

Another feature of an animal care ethic is the recognition that we have special moral

responsibilities to non-human beings that exist in the particular and private sphere of the home.
Here, I mean that care ethics and bioethics must not only concern itself with public animals like
lab rats and factory farmed animals, but also with the animals that live in our homes. Chris
Cuomo and Lori Gruen have argued that traditional distinctions between public and private
moral spheres have contributed to a “moral distance” that has led to an absence of animals and
the environment in moral discussion. In “On Puppies and Pussies,” Cuomo and Gruen argue that
the category boundaries of public and private distance companion animals from moral discussion
because they occupy the “private” sphere of the home. They argue that “[companion animals] are
thus relegated to the background of human ethical and political life” (130). Unfortunately, the
reality is that the animal ethics canon has left a discussion of companion animals to the margins.
Maybe this has to do with an undervaluing of closeness, emotion, and particularity in ethics.
Following a care ethics approach, Gruen and Cuomo argue that if we start in the private sphere
considering the affectionate bonds and relationships between companion animals and humans,
rather than the public sphere, we will have an “in”—an “emotional entry point”—into moral
relationships with other non-humans and nature, more generally. In other words, the starting
point in animal ethics and environmental ethics should be at the intimate and personal level
rather than the more abstract, general, and public level. In addition, moral relationships of the
home or the ‘private sphere’ have particular ethical importance to Martha Nussbaum. These
relationships are valuable because they are particular or unique. One cannot make
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generalizations about particular familial, fraternal, or romantic relationships because these sorts
of relationships never “come around again” in the exact same way. The uniqueness of particular
relationships makes them more valuable. Nussbaum writes that Aristotle has a similar view,
holding that
The thought that one’s children (for example) are ‘the only ones one has’ is an important
constituent of the love one has for them, and that without this thought of nonreplaceability a great part of the value and motivating force of the love will be undercut
(Nussbaum 39).
Like children or a beloved friend or spouse, our animal companions are irreplaceable. No two
dogs, e.g., are exactly the same, and the relationships one has with an animal are unique and
special because of this. On this, Burgess Jackson writes, “[t]wo dogs alike in all intrinsic
properties can stand in different relations to me, with the result that I can have a responsibility to
one of them that I do not have to the other” (176). In addition, philosopher Tony Milligan, in
Beyond Animal Rights (2010) writes that “[t]o share a life with an animal of any sort is to see it
as, at least up to a point, irreplaceable. By contrast, what a farmer tries to care about is the herd
or (if they are a specialist breeder) the type” (111). This view, that highlights the specialness of
individual animals, is very different from the egalitarian ethical approaches of Regan and Singer.
3.

Third, an animal care ethic must emphasize sensitivity and attunement to the needs of

dependent companion animals throughout their lives. Chapter one showed that companion
animals such as dogs, horses, and cats, throughout the historical process of domestication, have
been denied the ability to fend for themselves. Today, the fact is that a majority of companion
animals are bred commercially and sold to humans for human purposes. These animals are
reliant on humans to meet their daily physical needs. They are also dependent on humans and
other animal companions for their psychological well-being. As such, such animals are at the
mercy of us to attend to their needs of food, exercise, permission to procreate, play, socialization,
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etc. This dependency relationship is exaggerated by the fact that they cannot verbally
communicate their needs to the human animals that they share a space and life with. As a
vulnerable and dependent class of beings that are at the same time members of our intimate
familial unit and community, it makes sense to fit companion animals into the class of beings
that require our loving care and attention. As Held writes, “all care involves attentiveness,
sensitivity, and responding to needs. Needs are of innumerable subtle emotional and
psychological and cultural kinds, as well as of completely basic and simple kinds, such as for
sufficient calories to stay alive” (39). Recall that in chapter two, I argued that animals have such
complex emotional and psychological needs, as shown through critical science and philosophy.
Any act of caregiving for an animal must then be sensitive to the psychological and emotional
needs of animals, and not just their physical welfare (i.e., the basic needs of food, water, shelter
etc.), which is usually understood in negative terms, e.g., as the mere absence of pain.
In addition, being sensitive to the emotional as well as physical needs of an animal
requires adaptation. Adaptation relates to loving and forgiving care. Caring for and adapting to
an ill or aging animal is no easy task, and dealing with changes in personality, behavior, and
affect is difficult. To model the relationship of companionism, the human subject must be
prepared to adapt to her animals’ changing needs, rather than expect her animal to change for
her. Adaptive attention requires recognizing physical changes, such as body size and
temperature, but also assessing an animal’s overall emotional, psychological, and physical
welfare. The human subject should know what makes her animal happy, and assess whether or
not the animal subject is meeting a threshold of happiness it would accept. Jessica Pierce writes
of these aspects, arguing that there is something to gain when accommodating and attending to
an animal,
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Aging can be hard on animals and on their human companions. But the challenges of
aging can invite us to know and love new dimensions of our animals, as we become
particularly attuned to their evolving needs. It is a time for us to give back some of the
unconditional love, patience, and tolerance that our pets offer us throughout their lives
(56).
The sort of ‘giving back’ that Pierce illustrates exemplifies the reciprocity of caring
relationships. All companion relationships require a give and take of care, and sometimes caring
for our companions, both human and animal, will be hard. However, such challenges greatly
enhance our capacity to sympathize with the needs and suffering of others. For care ethicists,
enhancing our capacity to care represents the essence of moral growth and development.

4.

Lastly, as was argued in chapter two, in order to practice caregiving well, one must seek

to improve one’s knowledge base of the other and develop a sophisticated rather than simple
understanding of the other’s needs. Virginia Held has argued that if one has no knowledge of
how to care for another person, and does not seek out knowledge of how to care for the other,
then they really aren’t being caring at all (Held, 53). Cuomo and Gruen also write that
knowledge is tied to ethics:
One ethical problem that concerns us here is the fact that moral agents can be wrong
about who and what is morally relevant. When we fail to perceive and thus gain
knowledge and understanding of nonhuman members of our environments, we inevitably
remain cut off from those things and beings with whom we are intimately, ecologically,
connected (132).
Gruen and Cuomo argue that if we do not engage in an education of understanding the subject, it
is “likely to have a negative effect on moral agency and community” (ibid). Much of what we
can “know” about our animal’s needs rests on research in cognitive ethology, and the knowledge
base of veterinarians. The point here, though, is that when caring for an animal, it is our
responsibility to learn their language as best we can. Misinterpreting an animal’s smile, e.g., can
have very negative consequences. Towards the end of life, specifically, a caring companion must
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be able to read when their animal companion needs to go outside, needs assistance feeding,
needs some peace and quiet, or extra loving attention. Neuropsychologists like Stanley Coren
have developed ‘lexicons’ of animal behavior to help guide us in avoiding unpleasant
projections.13 This means we must modify our own behaviors if we are to truly understand
animals and to engage in loving perception. In chapter two, I argued that avoiding projection
required two things: a knowledge base, or basis of understanding the other (through scientific
and philosophical grounding) and a caring practice and disposition. The ‘Aunt Judy’ example
showed that care and knowledge are wedded. Thus, care and knowledge ought to inform each
other, especially when we are faced with the difficulty of interpreting the interests of other
beings across species.
Often, we come to understand human-animal continuities and human-animal differences
in two ways. One way is to learn from behavioral and ethological science and medicine, as was
discussed above. But, as most people who live with companion animals are not regular
subscribers to journals of ethological science and might be unfamiliar with recent discoveries in
animal science, we usually base our understanding of difference the “hard” way. In other words,
it is most often the case that we learn from our failures to attend to difference. For example, a
child might be bitten before she learns that her dog does not ‘smile’ the way that she does. She
might come to learn that her dog’s tail wagging and play positions better connote the meaning of
‘smile’ than showing his teeth.
In addition, not all companion animals have the same needs. An understanding of the
needs of a cat is going to be different than an understanding of the needs of a dog. And horses, in
addition, are domestic companions very different from cats and dogs. Their flight-responses are
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more easily triggered because they consider themselves prey. What may seem to us a benign
environment may seem uncomfortable or threatening to an equine. Failing to understand such
differences, then, between us, cats, dogs, and horses, among other companions such as snakes
and gerbils, e.g., could have devastating consequences. Thus understanding and attending to
difference requires an often difficult process of understanding that develops over time through
inter-species interactions and caring attention.
We must not assume that what is good for one animal is necessarily good for another,
even if they are of the same species. We can learn this the ‘hard way’ too. It is important to
recognize such differences because it allows us to learn to speak the animal’s language. Fudge
says that “asserting that animals have language is giving them a status that is missing in
anthropomorphic interpretations. They are not simply soundless symbols of human desires and
human anxieties but active, communicating beings engaged in world-making alongside humans”
(ibid). Pet emotion may be different from human emotion. Animal empathy may be different
from human empathy. The trick is to recognize this difference without giving up on attending to
them.

Conclusion
Though care ethics has been largely absent in the discussion of ethical dilemmas that are
central to animal caregiving, there is wisdom in care ethics that provides insight into how to give
appropriate care and attention to companion animals before they die. Here I have shown that care
ethics is the appropriate ethical tool for such caring. Now that we have a framework, we can
apply care ethics to the specific challenges that arise in end-of-life contexts with animals.
Chapter four will deal with such an application. Veterinarians, care ethicists, and ethologists
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should work together when undertaking the moral challenges that surface in animal end-of-life
contexts. But what has been shown is that an instrumentalist approach to animal caregiving is a
non-starter. It has also been shown that traditional ethical frameworks are insufficient ways of
approaching the moral complexities that arise in end-of-life medical contexts with animals. They
are insufficient because they flatten the complexities that arise with an ethic involving animals,
because they give subject-status to animals only in terms of human subjectivity (in a way that
fails to treat animals as animals). Finally, they fail to recognize the importance of caring
relations in ethics. Their position falls short because it views animals through an anthropocentric
lens, whereas an animal care ethic—an ethic of companionism—recognizes and celebrates
difference and thus best avoids the problem of projection.
The next chapter will survey the beliefs of veterinarians regarding an animal’s concepts
of illness, aging, death, and dying, as well as other relevant emotions like embarrassment and
pride. It will also survey the opinions of vets on the role of the caregiver, as well as appropriate
action in end-of-life decision-making. It will discuss tough questions that center around animal
hospice care and euthanasia. In chapter four, an animal ethic of care will remain very relevant.
There we will find that kind of person whose actions are guided by an ethic of care is more likely
to embody a relationship of companionism between the human and animal, and may be more
likely to choose animal hospice as a caregiving option. The kind of person who operates under
an attitude of either instrumentalism or paternalism, by contrast, may, e.g., be more likely to
consider euthanasia as the first option of care.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PRACTICING AN ANIMAL CARE ETHIC IN AN END-OF-LIFE CONTEXT
The last chapter discussed the care tradition in ethics, the need of a companion animal
ethic, and an outline of my companionism model of human-animal relations. There it was shown
that my model inherently follows the care tradition. Here, I will center the discussion of animal
caregiving in a medical context. Specifically, I will show how companionism works in practice,
particularly in an end-of-life context.
The field of biomedical ethics (here on, ‘bioethics’), in part, arose in response to a need
to address ethical quandaries that center on death and dying. In fact, bioethics is usually
canonized for its concern with physician assisted suicide, advance-directives for persistent
vegetative or otherwise permanently incapacitated patients, “do not resuscitate” statements, etc.
If such quandaries also arise with companion animals, then we ought to give attention to the
moral issues that arise in an end-of-life context with such animals.
But, the field of bioethics has operated mainly within the justice tradition discussed in
chapter three. Under the legacy of deontology and utilitarianism, the field has concerned itself
with duties to patients in abstract terms as “rights-bearers” and “interest-holders.” This is
because the field arose, to a significant degree, in response to blatant violations of the basic
rights of human subjects and medical patients. In response to the atrocious medical practices of
the past, a principle-based approach to medical ethics was established. The goal of medical ethics
at the time was to protect vulnerable patients from manipulation and abuse. An ethical
framework that protected every individual’s rights absolutely and universally was and still is a
desirable response to medical malpractice. The Belmont Report was established by the U.S.
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Department of Health and Human Services in 1979 and stated that the basic ethical principles of
medicine are respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. Though I think that these principles
of bioethics definitely apply to animals and humans generally, it is less clear how to respect such
rights with animals than it is for humans in an end-of-life context. For example, as humans, we
can talk about our right not to be resuscitated if, in advance and in writing, we say we wish not
to. This is because one of the principles of bioethics is the principle of respect for patient
autonomy. Humans can make their death interests and preferences explicit in writing. When
people do, our minimal duty is to respect their interests. We can have conversations in advance
with our physician and our family about such interests. We can appoint a ‘power of attorney,’—
someone we trust—to see that our death interests are met.
However, I’ll argue here that the justice tradition in ethics will not go far enough in
determining how to care for our ill and dying animals. Although the principles of respect,
beneficence, and justice may apply for animals generally, it is harder to explicitly respect an
animal’s preference autonomy when he or she cannot, due to a communication barrier, write out
or speak directly their death wishes to us. In addition, such principles cannot sufficiently address
the nuances of care that matter to particular individuals within a given context. Thus, the care
tradition’s conception of autonomy as relational and independent, as was discussed in chapter
three, seems the appropriate conception for companion animals. This is because animals depend
on our interpretation of their interests to get the care that they “prefer.” Recall that Gilligan
argued that under a relational logic of care, moral decisions cannot be made in the abstract. The
impartial and egalitarian ethic of Singer, Regan, and the Belmont Report, tells us nothing about
the particular ways to care for our animal companions who face the end of life. In chapter three, I
discussed how concrete particulars are essential for engaging our feelings of compassion,
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empathy, love, and friendship. Such emotions, care ethicists argue, are vital for ethics. Although
animals cannot create their own ‘advance directives’ or articulate their death wishes to us
verbally or in writing, we ought to assume that they still desire a peaceful and comfortable death.
This is an understandable “death wish” that we ought to take care to attend.
Premature Euthanasia, Animal Hospice, and Palliative Care
Here I will argue that a peaceful passing or a good death is usually not achieved by
premature euthanasia.14 If we are to truly care for our animals at the end of life, companionism
demands that we attune ourselves to the particular vulnerabilities and needs of our animal
companions at the end of life, as nobody’s needs are static. Every living being’s needs fluctuate
in the face of new circumstances, life stages, and events. Thus attending to needs requires
adaptation and adjustment to the newfound difficulties a particular animal faces when he or she
ages or falls ill.
However, premature euthanasia is often seen as the only option for elderly or terminally
ill animals. In the cases where there is no cure for illness or old age, a common belief is that
early euthanasia is the only way to show care or compassion. Many compassionate and caring
human companions may opt for premature euthanasia simply because they (and possibly even
their veterinarian) have never heard of in-home veterinary care, palliative animal care, or animal
hospice. They may not have knowledge of the alternative ways of caregiving available to them.
But when human patients fall ill or enter their elderly years, we treat them much better. If we
wish to be true companions, and truly care for our animals, we cannot choose premature
euthanasia for reasons of convenience. As our animals that live with us are intimate family
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members, loved ones, and dear friends, we ought to give them considerations similar to the
considerations we give to our other human companions. Premature euthanasia can often be
similar to ‘convenience euthanasia’ discussed in chapter one. For example, euthanizing an
animal prematurely because he or she becomes incontinent or is less mobile could be done for
instrumental rather than compassionate reasons. While incontinence and immobility can be
indicative of pain and suffering in an animal and such suffering ought to be taken into account,
we ought to be careful to consider such suffering, and never euthanize simply for our own
convenience.
Animal hospice is often seen as a mediatory treatment of suffering for geriatric animals
and palliation (or palliative care) is a caregiving option concerned with treating emotional and
physical suffering via comfort care in the absence of an incurable disease or illness. Both hospice
and palliative care are alternatives to premature euthanasia; these care perspectives do not
promote euthanasia as a first or primary caregiving option. However, many veterinarians who
provide hospice and palliative care agree that euthanasia, when done with care, can be an
eventual viable option for ending acute animal suffering and can provide a peaceful passing.
Caring, as Held argues, is a practice. It involves actions and sometimes difficult commitments.
In what follows, I will show what such caring practices would look like.
Bioethicist Jessica Pierce has recently pioneered a moral analysis and philosophical
discussion of end-of-life issues with companion animals, and her analysis gets past talk of basic
rights and dwells on the complexities and challenges that arise when an animal enters old age.
Her book The Last Walk (2012) chronicles her dog Ody’s last year of life. Through her firstperson perspective as a caregiver for her aged beloved dog, she exemplifies the companionship
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relationship articulated in chapter three, which seems to me to be the best way to care for
companion animals when they age and fall ill.
Animal hospice, as Pierce writes, is more of a “philosophy of care” than it is a mode of
treatment (Pierce 10). Though she is not directly referring to care ethics as a philosophical
framework, her use of the term ‘care’ implies much more than basic medical care. In the practice
of geriatric animal medicine and animal hospice, ideally, the human client works with a team of
animal professionals. This team can include a veterinarian, a veterinary technician, and
volunteers. Pierce argues that death, whether for a human or animal, should be meaningful. In
other words, companion animals deserve the “freedom to die a good death” (13).
Death is obviously meaningful to the one who dies. It is like the final cadence at the end
of a piece of music, bringing the music to its necessary harmonic resolution. But perhaps
it is especially so to those who survive. Death affirms the value of life, and if we are to
value animals, we must value their deaths (Pierce, 13).
Humans play a large role in how an animal dies. Though animals are considered personal
property in most jurisdictions in the U.S., my hope is that most persons who live with animals
value their animal’s life very differently than the way they value their cars. I have argued that
relating to animals in purely instrumental terms is morally repugnant. Most people see their
animals as companions, and as members of their family. But at the same time, people may be out
of touch with or confused about how to value and care for their animal at the end-of-life. This
may be because people are unaware of the diversity of options available to their ailing or elderly
animals, such as carts, ‘doggie diapers,’ ramps, acupuncture, homeopathic dietary and stressrelief options, and comfortable in-home euthanasia. Often, human companions ultimately make
the final call on whether or not to euthanize their animal. We must be careful to facilitate an
animal’s departure mindfully and compassionately by focusing on a meaningful death. Animal
hospice and palliative care options are there to ensure that humans will facilitate animal death as
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thoughtfully and compassionately as they can. Attending to the needs of an animal in an end of
life context vary and depend on the particular animal one cares for. But examples of ways to
meet end of life needs are by relieving pain and discomfort whilst engaging socially with one’s
animal, adjusting such engaging practices as needed. For example, expressions of companionship
like playing and walking might need to be adjusted if one’s animal becomes immobile. As Dr.
Tina Ellenbogen says, one could modify the game of “fetch” by rolling a ball to an animal rather
than throwing it (see appendix E). One might also acquire a dog-cart, e.g., to assist in walking.
For another example, one could assist their animal if he or she becomes incontinent by
developing and committing to special diets and new medicines, as well as developing in
themselves qualities of character such as patience and compassion. One could take care that the
animal does not feel ashamed and does not experience anxiety when losing control of bodily
functions and having an “accident” on the carpet. Pierce says that “[t]he burden of care in animal
hospice falls squarely on the animal’s Person, and this can shape the landscape of options and
choices” (132). We ought to shape the landscape of options in such a way that fosters a
meaningful departure.

A Meaningful Departure
Death, for all living beings, is a natural part of life. Gail Pope, founder of BrightHaven, a
hospice sanctuary for companion animals in California, says that death is a biological process
that is “naturally prepared for.” Although in some cases her organization provides compassionate
euthanasia to geriatric animals, she supports ‘natural death’ as the compassionate option for
animals because of personal research and experiences. She wrote to me that
[w]e have seen many animals presumed hours away from death, and who have been
recommended for euthanasia, recover and live on for months and sometimes years. The
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thought that we almost killed them…I can hardly bear to think about it. I have been
taught now that I should honor the circle of life and death and have come to respect the
process of transition as completely natural—as that of birth itself: the circle of life thus
becoming complete (see appendix K).
Taking life too soon because of presumed suffering worries Pope. But though animal life is
precious, it is important to distinguish whether the longevity of life through animal hospice is
truly good for the animal as a disease progresses. Knowing when to promote longevity through
hospice or to relieve suffering requires an understanding of one’s particular companion. The
‘right’ way to care depends on the particular animal, the particular disease, and the context of
care. Though the longevity of life is good, we must be ever mindful of our particular animal’s
emotional and physical well-being.
A meaningful departure does not have to mean that an animal experiences a natural
death. In fact, though dying naturally can be relatively peaceful, natural death for those living
through illness and disease is often an unpleasant, if not nasty, experience. Ace’s vet, Dr. Jeff
Dahl, writes that
Some clients are somewhat opposed to active euthanasia, and just want their pets to ‘die
naturally and peacefully in his bed at home.’ We would all like for that, but the problem
is that it rarely happens. Many geriatric illnesses can drag on for a long time, and carry
with them some degree of pain and suffering. Pets don’t go from healthy one day to
dying peacefully overnight. A slow death from anorexia or dehydration, though ‘natural,’
is not in any way peaceful (see appendix C).
Dr. Dahl also says that if one prefers a ‘natural death’ for their animal, then hospice care is a
great option for end-of-life, but that the option of true hospice care is a “rare thing for pets.” As
was discussed earlier, animal hospice and palliative care requires a heavy physical and emotional
commitment to one’s animal. Thus, when choosing the death option for an animal—via a natural
passing or euthanasia—one must place the choice within a familial, social, and historical context.
Our responsibility to provide a comfortable care, whether by natural death or a euthanasia
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procedure, is not a choice we freely make as purely autonomous individuals. Rather, recall that
responsibilities are “presented to us by the accidents of our embeddedness in familial, social, and
historical contexts” (Held, 14). The choices I will make on behalf of Ace and Molly in the
future, for example, depend on my family’s relationship with them and my family’s knowledge
of what’s good for them. It will also depend on the social context of care, e.g., what care options
are available to them (is there a veterinarian willing to provide in-home care in the area?), what
is feasible (how much can our family afford?), and our traditional veterinarian’s opinions and
insights. Finally, the choice will depend on Ace and Molly’s life history, including their
personality, their desires and interests, their triggers, what has brought them joy and happiness,
etc. End of life decisions, then, depend on the concrete particulars embedded in the animal’s web
of caring relations.
Euthanasia, when done as a last resort, and chosen after a consideration of the holistic
context of one’s animals’ suffering, can be an act of love and compassion. Acute physical
suffering may or may not justify euthanasia. There is no way to list necessary conditions that
hold always and must be met in order to determine whether a euthanasia decision is acceptable.
Rather, we do our best to understand our animals’ interests in a holistic context (as was discussed
in our discussion of Regan in chapter two). We ought to consider both the emotional and
physical well-being of the animal. Euthanasia in some severe cases of physical suffering, e.g.,
could be but is not necessarily always a form of compassionate care. In other words, an
empathic attunement to the suffering of our animal may sometimes, but not always, commit us to
compassionate euthanasia. Now, true empathy and compassion, as I showed in chapter three,
must always be extremely mindful of the problem of projection—that’s why it’s important to
consider the whole context of an animal’s suffering and well-being (both physical and
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emotional). We must come at death from the animal’s point of view and not ours. Pierce rightly
notes that there is no way to know without doubt when the ‘Right Time’ for euthanasia is, but
when we make this ultimate decision, we ought to be there for the animal emotionally, even if it
is hard on us. Also, we should be mindful of the environment of departure. The veterinarian’s
office may not be the ideal environment. Mobile veterinarians make it their mission to come into
people’s homes to care for animals in people’s homes. In a comfortable space, they administer
the euthanasia procedure in order to promote the most peaceful and meaningful departure
environment possible. Dr. Dahl, though he practices traditional veterinary medicine, has done
approximately 100 in-home euthanasia’s in his career. Some of the most memorable, he says,
have been performed outdoors.
Two [euthanasia’s] in particular, that stand out were large-breed dogs lying outside in the
shade of their favorite trees. Owners sat in the grass next to their pets, talking with them,
petting them, and crying. Songs of birds and a gentle breeze made a very difficult and
painful time just slightly easier. I hope that somewhere down the road, near the
‘acceptance’ phase of the grief, thoughts of that time bring a sorrowful smile. I know it
does for me, as one of them was my own pet. I also know that, if given the choice, that is
how I’d like to go someday (see appendix C).
If the particular space underneath the shade of that tree brought peace and comfort to a dog
throughout its life, then it seems a preferable environment to the vet clinic. Choosing a peaceful
environment is an expression of compassion and empathy and is a nice way to frame the way we
ought to attend to an animal that nears the end of his or her life. The key to empathy is to be
sensitive and attuned to our animal’s needs as best we can, and to avoid putting our needs and
preferences above the animals’. But the story of passing under a tree as described above
illustrates, in my opinion, an example of an ideal euthanasia situation.
Recall that in chapter one, I discussed the different kinds of relationships that humans can
have with animals. Such different relationships rest along a spectrum, with instrumentalism
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being the least desirable, paternalism being a more preferable alternative, and companionism as
the ideal human-animal relationship. As Pierce rightly states that the burden of care falls
squarely on the animal’s ‘Person,’ it is important to have both an ethical framework to help guide
the human caregiver as well as a web of support and resources, e.g., a hospice team, to ensure
that an animal experiences a good death. Above I discussed briefly what animal hospice and
palliative care does. This has all been to show that the companionism model discussed in chapter
three is best achieved through such exemplary caregiving in an end-of-life context. However, it
is important to note that the companionism model is the ideal, but in practice, we rarely reach the
ideal. Making end-of-life decisions for our animal companions will be messy, difficult, and often
fills us with feelings of guilt or inadequacy.
Companionism in Practice
To understand what being a true companion would look like in an end-of-life context, I
asked veterinary professionals who were familiar with end-of-life caregiving and animal hospice
for their insights. In November of 2012, I had the pleasure of meeting some of a body of 150
hospice veterinarians at a conference in Denver, Colorado. These veterinary professionals are
particularly emotionally and ethically driven every day by what they do for animals.
Understanding their insights might help us to work better with them in providing the best care for
our animals. In a research questionnaire (see appendices), I first asked a handful of these
veterinary professionals what the role of the human caregiver (their human client) was in an endof-life context. Secondly, I asked them about the problem of projection—specifically, whether
they thought that their human clients for the most part interpreted their animal’s beliefs and
preferences correctly. Third, I asked them what the best tools were for interpreting an animal’s
feelings and interests. And finally, I asked them if they believed, through their experience as
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professionals, that animals experience complex emotions that are relevant to death and dying.
Their responses to these questions suggested that caregivers ought to operate under an ethics of
care. Their language was not of universal principles such as rights or duties. What they said
suggested that, in an end-of-life context, we ought to first see the animal through the lens of a
loving, rather than arrogant eye. They talked about the importance of attunement and sensitivity
to the needs of dependent and vulnerable animal companions. In what follows, I will draw from
their narratives to illustrate what a relationship of companionism looks like in practice at the end
of life.

The Role of the Caregiver
The first specific question in the questionnaire was “[h]ow would you articulate the role
of the caregiver (the role of your human clients) in an end-of-life context? (E.g., duties,
obligations, qualities of character, etc.)” (see appendices). In the question, I expected my
examples to prompt a discussion of rights and duties. But even with such a prompt suggestive of
a principle-based ethic, the responses I received were expressive of an ethic of care rather than
duty. For example, Dr. Tyler Carmack, a veterinarian who provides hospice and in-home
euthanasia to her community in Virginia, argued that pet owners have a responsibility to
“consider life from their pet’s point of view […] no matter how hard [it] is on them” (see
appendix B). The last chapter discussed how to look at another being through the lens of a loving
versus arrogant eye, which requires the perceiver to see the other as separate and distinct with his
or her own unique needs and preferences. Dr. Carmack makes exactly this point. Her point
illustrates that the caregiver’s role starts with loving perception, but that some human clients
need help and instruction to make such a transition in “point of view.” Veronica McCullion, a
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certified veterinary technician from Florida and a woman who has devoted the last 25 years of
her life to taking care of disabled and senior dogs, argues that for the caregiver, “[i]t is
imperative that they find a place of calm that can pervade the environment so that the animal can
find peace instead of chaos.” This “place of calm” is not just a physical place. What McCullion
is alluding to here is that some people inadequately handle the responsibility of caring for their
elderly animals “due to their own fear of death.” Sometimes the way we grieve can turn an
otherwise peaceful environment into a space of chaos. She says,
[The caregiver’s] duty is to grieve in a healthy way, […] getting help if needed but to not
allow their grief to hinder a good transition for the pet. We don’t send our elders out to
die on an ice flow. They, in the best-case scenario, are taken care of in the home or a
nursing facility. As our pets are an integral part of the family, they deserve the same best
scenario (see appendix I).
The “best-case scenario” that McCullion mentions is suggestive of a transition to animal hospice
and palliative care. McCullion shows that the different ways we grieve can affect an animal’s
psychological and physical welfare. Further, projecting our own fear of death onto an animal
could create problems. Animals are sensitive to human emotions, even if they may not have an
awareness of their own impending death. If our emotions or expressions of grief can contribute
to anxiety and suffering in animals, then we ought to be mindful of it.
Dr. Amir Shanan is a veterinarian in Chicago who has provided hospice care for animals
since 1995. He is the founder and former president of the International Association of Animal
Hospice and Palliative Care, and is driven by a mission of compassion for ailing and geriatric
animals. When I asked him in the questionnaire about the role of the caregiver, he responded that
our “obligation is to focus on the animal’s physical and emotional needs” (see appendix L).
These needs include “regularly assessing the animal’s QOL [quality of life] for any changes,
fluctuations and/or trends” in behavior or demeanor which could indicate changes in quality of
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life. He also iterates exactly what Dr. Carmack had said, namely, that “maintaining a clear vision
of the distinction between the animal’s needs and the caregiver’s needs, and addressing each
independently” is essential to quality care. Dr. Shanan expressed that qualities of character that
the caregiver should embody are:
the ability to feel empathy with and compassion for the animal, the ability to understand
what the animal’s needs are, the ability to understand what the caregiver’s duties and
obligations are, and the integrity to meet those obligations and perform duties to the best
of the caregiver’s ability (my emphases, ibid).

Qualities of character, for Dr. Shanan, reflect the aspects of care that the previous chapter
discussed were essential to care ethics. He discussed the importance of caring emotions, an
attention to the particular needs of our vulnerable animal companions, and putting such emotions
and attention to careful practice. Dr. Roark Freeman, a 34-year veterinarian who provides
hospice care, wrote that he disagrees with his human client’s decisions for care “only when I feel
the client is putting themselves before the pet (not thinking of the pet’s best interest)” (see
appendix F). Dr. Freeman, like many other veterinarians and animal care professionals had
mentioned, says that conflicts in caregiving decisions between the veterinarian and their human
client arise either from the client’s denial or fear of death. He writes that “often, this comes from
either a denial of the reality of the situation (hoping against hope for longevity) or a too-fast
judgment (he’s not going to get better; let’s put him down).” He writes that hospice care provides
a way to mitigate between the two extreme human responses just mentioned. Hospice provides
“in-between accommodations” that “help the pet cope and flourish” (ibid). In addition, Dr.
Edwina LeMay, a mobile hospice veterinarian and in-home euthanasia provider for small
animals in Kentucky, says that the role of the caregiver is to ask for help if he or she is in “a
denial state.” In addition to asking for help, “their role is to listen to and observe their pet’s signs
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of suffering (see appendix H).” By stating that the role of the caregiver is to ask for help, Dr.
LeMay draws attention to the fact that caring is relational. Caring cannot sufficiently be done
alone, as one may lack the medical knowledge appropriate for making health-care decisions for
someone else. When we struggle with choices regarding must be done for the good of our
animals, we seek help from friends, family, and veterinarians.
Denial and fear, as many vets wrote, can inhibit good care. Dr. LeMay told a story of an
in-home euthanasia where a 40-year old single mom of two young children allowed her children
to be present. She wrote that the family was “very involved in ritual, songs, and prayers.” This
story was supposed to show that “death is a part of life and [is] not to be feared” (ibid). Unlike
this family, though, “some do wait too long to call.” Dr. Lemay understands that death is hard for
every family, and so she does not blame her clients. Dr. Dahl also understands the struggle his
human clients experience when making end of life decisions. He writes that in addition to being
a veterinarian, “I am also a pet owner and an animal lover, and I struggle with the decision for
my own pets as my clients do with their pets” (see appendix C). He warns his clients that 50% of
his clientele questions “whether they decided to have it done too early” and the other 50%
question if they waited too long. Guilt is an expected emotion for end of life caregivers in both
cases.

Additional Considerations on the Part of the Caregiver
While the most obvious role of the caregiver is to attend to the animal lovingly and
compassionately, the suffering animal patient is not the only being whose interests matter. The
human caregiver ought to consider his or her own needs, and not overburden themselves by
caring in a way that is detrimental to their own physical or emotional health. Also, As Gail Pope
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writes, we ought to avoid providing hospice care that significantly conflicts with the needs of
other animal family members (see appendix K). In other words, we ought to ensure that all
animals that live in our homes are well cared for and do not feel left out in a hospice context.
Finally, though neither we nor the veterinarians understand with any supreme authority what an
animal’s interests are, we ought to listen to and appreciate the perspective of the veterinarian
because they are members of our animal’s web of caring relations. Veterinarians are not “forhire” technicians the way that auto-mechanics are. Veterinarians, rather, are medical
professionals that are not only proficient in recognizing symptoms of and diagnosing illness and
disease, but are also, from my experience, often proficiently sensitive to matters of the heart. In
addition, they may themselves inhabit a spiritual perspective that frames, motivates, and guides
the work that they do. For instance, Dr. Ellenbogen, a hospice veterinarian who has been
providing in-home end of life care for 25 years in Washington State, feels strongly that while
providing care, especially in-home euthanasia, she must be true to her core and spiritual beliefs.
She writes,
I have a covenant with each animal patient, and not only do I have to feel comfortable
either with administering euthanasia […] or providing palliative care ongoing, but that it
must be ok with that animal. I have walked into a home (usually this is a new client), and
had the animal look at me as if to say ‘thank goodness, you’ve come to help me’ when
the owner may not have been 100% sure it was ‘the right time.’ I’ve also discovered there
are times when euthanasia is the right decision based on practicalities in dealing with a
terminal illness […] but that the animal isn’t really ready to go at that time (see appendix
E).
I have met with Dr. Ellenbogen and have discovered that she experiences a deeply personal
connection with her animal patients. She is a wonderful person and does a lot of good for the
sake of animals. My hunch is that most veterinarians probably feel the way that Dr. Ellenbogen
does. We must be open to cases where veterinarians may disagree with our decisions, even if we
feel that our decisions are in the best interest of our animal. Though we know our own animals
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well, and we may in fact have the best interests of our animal in mind, veterinarians have seen a
lot more animal departures than we have. Their opinions may be very enlightening. Most
importantly, veterinarians, unlike auto-mechanics, are not at our beck-and-call to perform
euthanasia procedures if, upon seeing the animal patient, they do not feel comfortable with going
through with it. Care ethics requires recognizing ourselves as situated in a web of relationships,
and the veterinarians we work with are key members of this web of caring relations.
Interpreting an Animal’s Interests
Recall that chapters two and three discussed how true caring requires the knowledge base
appropriate for good care. One must have a thorough understanding of the other’s needs in order
to appropriately care for them, and this requires a great deal of attention to the other. So, if we
are to attend to our animals at the end of life, then what tools do we have? In the responses to my
research questionnaire, many veterinary professionals discussed with me the various tools that
are useful in interpreting animal interests. For the most part, quality of life scales were explained
as useful tools. Such scales act as daily logs or worksheets that a human caregiver can use to
track an animal’s physical welfare. Quality of life scales are especially useful for tracking the
physical well-being of animals, but their focus is not on tracking emotional well-being. Quality
of life scales are also not consistent, and may vary in different veterinary practices. Despite the
varying scales used, Dr. Alice Villalobos’s “HHHHHMM” scale has become a very frequent
standard and is worth mentioning. Villalobos’s scale stands for Hurt, Hunger, Hydration,
Hygiene, Happiness, Mobility, and More Good Days than Bad. Each is scored on a 1-10 scale,
and a score greater than 35 is deemed “acceptable” for continued hospice care.15 Though
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Adapted by Villalobos, A.E., Quality of Life Scale Helps Make Final Call, Veterinary Practice News, Sept. 2004;
for Canine and Feline Geriatric Oncology Honoring the Human-Animal Bond, by Blackwell Publishing, Table 10.1,
released 2006. Taken from http://www.veterinarypracticenews.com/images/pdfs/Quality_of_Life.pdf
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prevalently used, this is just one scale, and there is no objective or universal consensus yet on
how these scales should be written. What’s important, says Dr. Robin Downing, a certified
veterinary pain practitioner and the founder of the Downing Center of Animal Pain Management,
is that “no matter what [scale] is used, it’s the trends that are important” (see appendix D). These
scales, in other words, are especially important for recognizing trends either in the improvement
or diminishment of quality of life that may have otherwise gone unnoticed without such
documentation.
Another tool for interpreting an animal’s interests and making decisions about their
overall welfare is to have what Veronica McCullion calls a ‘baseline’ by which to compare later
symptoms against the animal’s healthy ‘base.’ She argues that “[w]ith baselines in place then at a
later time when symptoms arise there is something to set parameters and it makes the end-of-life
decisions easier” (see appendix I). Baselines can be established through an overall assessment of
an animal’s base health—through bloodwork, body weight, dental health, etc. When an animal’s
health deteriorates from his or her ‘base,’ “[k]eeping a daily log of that day’s activities from
bowel movements to limb movements” is important (ibid). Keeping such daily logs is
representative of the sort of attentive practices that care ethics is concerned with. In addition,
Gail Pope writes that “If one is working with a homeopathic veterinarian, every little detail can
be of the utmost importance and should be recorded” (see appendix K).
Aside from quality of life scales and baselines, there are other tools in the toolbox for
interpreting animal interests. Dr. Carmack mentions that “stories of others and analogies to
human diseases/conditions help a lot.” Bekoff argues a similar point, that analogies, even in
ethology, are a good tool for making sense of animal behaviors, thoughts, and feelings. The trick
here is making use of analogy in a way that still accounts for the uniqueness of the particular
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animal whose health and welfare are in question. There ought to be a high degree of emotional
sensitivity and attention that is involved in making such analogies. On this, Dr. Dahl writes
I think we can empathize and know what we would like if we were in the same position
as the pet […] We must realize how much they love physical attention and comforting,
and that they are sometimes not able to seek it out so much, and their hearing and vision
are often deficient, so more time spent in physical contact is important (petting, maybe
letting them sleep on the bed though they weren’t allowed to in their younger years, etc.)
(see appendix C).
In addition, Dr. Ellenbogen says that in addition to quality of life and pain scales, you must “trust
your heart and what you know about your pet—what have they enjoyed most in life?” (see
appendix E). Only the human client knows the answer to this. Pope, like Dr. Ellenbogen,
encourages such personal sensitivity. She writes that in addition to Villalobos’ five “H’s,” we
ought to add another “H”’ to that list: one of ‘heart’—following your own!” (see appendix K).
But as Pope, Dr. Ellenbogen, and Dr. McVety point out, trusting one’s heart is not enough. One
must be informed about the illness or disease by which the animal suffers. Dr. Dani McVety, a
hospice veterinarian and C.E.O./co-founder of Lap of Love Animal Hospice, writes that the best
tool for interpreting animal interests is face-to-face communication with a veterinarian. She
writes,
I can walk into a home and tell 20+ things about the pet that the owner hasn’t seen—
signs of pain, discomfort, anxiety, etc.—that all weigh greatly on quality of life. More
importantly, I know the disease progression the pet is going to take much better than the
owner. The family doesn’t know that their heart-failure pet that looks “ok” now will, at
some point, die by drowning on his own fluid if they wait too long—that’s what I’m there
for, to educate them on the things they don’t know (see appendix J)!
Adequate caring requires a basis of understanding of the needs of the one receiving care, and our
veterinarian often has, medically speaking, the most thorough understanding of an animal’s
physical needs within the animal’s web of caregiving relations. Again, true end-of-life caregiving
is a team-effort that weighs heavily on the part of both the human caregiver and the veterinarian.
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Finally, Pope, who favors a natural passing for the animals she cares for, warns us that
quality of life scales will not give us definitive answers regarding an animal’s preferences
interests at the end-of-life. She writes that “[p]oor quality of life does not necessarily translate to
‘I want to die’” (see appendix K). Though many humans, as well as animals, may not score high
on quality of life scales at the end of their lives, they may be “absolutely NOT ready to die”
(ibid). Again, this shows that we must be sensitive to an avoidance of projecting our own
interests onto an animal’s.

End of Life Emotions?
When I asked if they thought companion animals experienced emotions of shame, pride,
or embarrassment, most veterinary professionals spoke cautiously in the affirmative. As
veterinary professionals have seen quite a spectrum of behaviors, and have cared for quite a vast
array of companion animals throughout their careers, their insights, to me, seem particularly
credible. Take, for example, Dr. Carmack’s response to this question. She said, regarding the
question of whether animals experience such emotions,
Absolutely. I think dogs especially become frustrated and anxious when they become
incontinent and/or lose their mobility. Some pets will allow owners to do everything for
them (i.e. change ‘diapers,’ assist in walking, etc.), while others seem determined to do to
on their own and seem to resent help (see appendix B).
This seems to imply that, like humans, animals are individuals, and some are more prideful and
independent than others. Just as there are needy as well as independent humans, there are such
differences in animals. Pierce writes that “[t]he study of animal personality is important for many
reasons, not the least of which is that in trying to understand, treat, minimize (and prevent!)
animal pain, and to maximize animal pleasure, we must pay attention to the uniqueness of each
individual” (120). Pierce calls all human companions to pay attention to the particularity of their
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animals, and to not make too many generalizations about them. Dr. Dahl mentioned that while
dogs may not have a “concept” of dignity, they can show signs of dignity. He writes,
I recently lost my 3-legged dog. When he started struggling to rise and mobilize in his
hind end (with his single leg), I got him a really nice cart. When set in the cart, he would
refuse to move, but as soon as the cart was removed, he’d use all his strength to bound
away as if to say ‘that cart is beneath my dignity, and I don’t need it.’ I would tell people
he had too much dignity to use his cart, because that is a concept I understand, but I doubt
he really rationalized it that way. To him, it just probably didn’t seem natural and he
didn’t understand it (see appendix C).
Dignity is a hard concept to define, even for humans. Philosophers are still unsure what exactly
this concept means. However, we often talk about dignity in terms of the emotions that we
usually associate with it, such as pride when dignity is maintained, or humiliation when it is
violated. Such studies of animal emotions that are related to the concept of dignity (e.g., pride
and humiliation) ought to be investigated in the field of ethology. In the meantime, we ought to
be wary of the quick and dangerous conclusions people draw when talking about animal dignity.
For example, one might argue that “since Fido became incontinent, he no longer had his dignity,
and thus euthanasia was the most compassionate way to alleviate his emotional suffering.” We
need to attend to our animals and care for their needs in a more robust sense than this—
euthanasia merely because of perceived humiliation from Fido’s wetting the carpet is a
projection with dangerous consequences. The question here in Dr. Dahl’s example was whether
the dog just did not understand the cart, or if he was humiliated by the thought of using it. If the
latter is true, then we ought to consider the emotional suffering associated with the use of dog
carts for one’s particular animal, for example, and find a different way to attend to the dog’s
mobility needs. As Dr. Dahl’s story shows, some dogs are willing to try new things and adapt,
and others (like his dog) find adapting, to carts for example, particularly uncomfortable. When
animals cannot adapt to our expectations, then we must work to try to adapt to theirs. Some
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animals are more extraverted than others. Some are more or less anxious and neurotic, just as
some are more or less agreeable and calm. Such traits may change following the onset of disease
and old-age. The point is that we ought to focus on the non-static and particular personality of an
animal in order to avoid projection. Our attunement to the particulars of an animal amounts to
more attentive and mindful care.
McCullion rightly points out that, though we may find behavior indicative of animal
emotions that center around aging, illness, death and dying—emotions such as pride, shame,
fear, depression, and embarrassment—we understand these emotions in terms of human culture
and language. An animal’s experience or understanding of such emotions is going to be quite
different. She also rightly points out that there are nuances within these emotions for humans,
and thus the same goes for animals. On such end-of-life emotions, she writes that “Webster may
have defined these concepts, but each human experiences them differently, in varying degrees”
(see appendix I). With these qualifications, she then offers some very interesting examples of
animal emotion,
I once had a dignified dog who in his final days lost control of his bowels in bed…he
seemed ashamed. In reality I don’t know if I was anthropomorphizing at that moment. A
behaviorist told me it was probably fear of being in trouble. He had never been in trouble
his entire life so that can’t be right.
One person told me the story of her dog racing around the house and bouncing off the
sofas. He missed one day and seemed very embarrassed.
[A] groomer/trainer told me she did field trials with her dogs and it was not uncommon to
witness all but shame in her dogs if they succeeded or failed. She never punished or
scolded her dogs so it was not fear (ibid).
On cats, Pope writes that “[p]ride will always be seen in a cat who has caught a mouse” (see
appendix K)! Though these stories are anecdotal, they seem to reflect similar scenarios that many
people who live with animals, especially dogs, have witnessed. The possibility that animals
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experience complex emotions such as pride, shame, and embarrassment, very likely will be
supported by empirical evidence through the field of cognitive ethology. If we reflect on our
evolutionary continuity with other animals, then granting that animals have such similar
emotions makes some sense. In addition, homo sapiens have cohabited homes with animals for
tens of thousands of years. In that sense, quite possibly some of our animal’s (especially dog’s)
emotional sensibilities have co-adapted to human emotional sensibilities, and vice-versa. If this
is the case—if, for example, some animals feel ashamed when they lose control of their
bowels—then we ought to not only attend to their physical needs (e.g. ‘doggie diapers,’ change
of diet, etc.) but also to their emotional needs. We must be sensitive to their emotional states, not
just their physical states. To repeat an earlier example, we must let the animal know that when he
or she has an “accident,” they are not in trouble. We must try to alleviate the emotional anxieties
that come with an animal’s adjustment to the onset of illness and old age.
Regarding a concept of illness, aging, death, and dying, Dr. McVety writes that “the most
common thing I see that proves to me that pets have a concept of ‘aging’ […] is that the ranks
within the packs change. It is common for an owner to tell me—Fluffy used to be alpha but now
Max has been taking over the role…and Fluffy is the one I’m euthanizing” (see appendix J). Dr.
LeMay also writes of this that “the pack order changes when one ails—the other members
sometimes challenge the ill animals” (see appendix H). This change in pack hierarchy may
significantly affect an animal’s emotional well-being, and is something we ought to be
particularly sensitive to.
In addition, regarding a concept of death, Dr. McVety writes “I had one 2 year old lab
that was super hyper before I euthanized his 15 year old housemate […] After [euthanasia], he
refused to come out from behind the couch; he was very upset.” Dr. Downing, though she is
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skeptical that animals have the self-awareness necessary to consider illness, aging, death, and
dying, writes that “animals do have a rich emotional life and certainly do exhibit, for instance,
the emotional exhaustion that comes from chronic, unmitigated pain” (see appendix D).
Regarding animal emotion, then, care ethics requires, first, that we attend to an animal’s
emotional suffering by being there for them as companions. Secondly, it requires our sensitivity
to when their social life (e.g., disorder in pack-rank) changes for the worse. And finally, it
requires that we assist them when it becomes especially hard for them to pursue activities that
bring them joy.
Animal Hospice and Further Research
Veterinarians need to work with ethologists whenever there are grey-areas or gaps in the
knowledge base of veterinary medicine. Cognitive ethology becomes especially pertinent in our
understanding of animal emotions, particularly in an end-of-life context. In other words, though
we can learn from veterinarians regarding how to attend to the immediate physical health of our
animals, questions about animal cognition, and more precisely, questions regarding whether
companion animals have concepts of aging, illness, death, dying, embarrassment, pride, etc., are
still questions that need to be supported by empirical research in cognitive ethology. Although
the narratives of the veterinary professionals discussed here are compelling, in addition,
cognitive ethologists must endeavor to frame research further into animal concepts and animal
emotions, especially emotions that center on death and dying. Ethologists have made great
strides recently in the area of animal emotion. Chapter two mentioned how research into
compassion and empathy in animals is becoming very prevalent in ethological science. However,
if providing quality medical care to animals depends on ethology, ethologists ought to focus
more attention on questions in veterinary medicine that have yet to be answered.
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For now, in absence of sufficient ethological research, we ought to consider the insights
of veterinarians, especially those who specialize in palliative and hospice care, when determining
how to best care for our animal companions. We ought to value veterinarians as key components
in the web of caring relations between humans and companion animals. In addition, we must
engage in caring practices with our animals when they fall ill and age. An animal care ethic in
practice recognizes that the needs of our animals are separate and distinct from our own. We
must be patient, and ready to adapt to their needs. And, as Bekoff’s Wager suggests, we must be
open to the possibility that animals experience complex emotions that center on death and dying.
If we assume that they do experience such emotions, we may better attune ourselves to providing
comfortable care. Relieving anxieties that arise in a context of illness and aging is an important
part of caring attention.
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CONCLUSION
In this project, I have suggested that the particular way we relate to companion animals is
ethically significant. First, in chapter one, I argued that of all the ways that humans can relate to
companion animals, my model of companionism ought to be the ideal. In chapter two, I argued
that, although we cannot know with any certainty that animals in fact have psychological states,
we are ethically obligated to assume that they do. Research into animal cognition increasingly
supports the idea that animals have minds and even experience complex higher-order emotions.
If we are morally obligated to assume animals have such states, and they likely experience
higher-order emotions, then we ought to consider their psychological as well as physical welfare.
Chapter three showed us, through an animal care ethic framework of companionism, how we can
and should attune ourselves to the psychological needs of our animal companions, and how to
best avoid the problem of projection. Finally, here in chapter four, I discussed, through the
narratives of veterinary professionals, what we can know about animal interests in an end-of-life
contexts and how we can best attend to them. Animal hospice and palliative care, the option I
think best corresponds to an animal care ethic and a relationship of companionism, is the
preferred alternative to a more instrumental approach to animal death by means of premature
euthanasia. The implications of the arguments within this project are that convenience euthanasia
is morally reprehensible. In addition, premature euthanasia, though it often is done in
consideration of an animal’s welfare interest, is morally undesirable if hospice and palliative care
is truly the more caring alternative.
Of course, even in a hospice context, we will not be able to “know” beyond a shadow of
a doubt what an animal’s interests are. There is no way to be a perfect companion to one’s
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animal during their last days. We have no manual that all people can follow and no way to know
for sure that we did everything right by our animals. This is not unique to animals—we humans
struggle with this with our family too. Again, in end-of-life caregiving decisions there will
always be a feeling of uncertainty and guilt. On this, Pierce writes,
Ody has lived well past the 12.5 Vizsla average, so maybe we did okay. But couldn’t we,
shouldn’t we have done better? Could have and should have. This phrase is full of regret,
of things not done or not said. And for me, it encapsulates the role of caregiver for an
elderly animal” (emphasis added, 71).
Choosing animal hospice or palliative care over euthanasia as a first option is difficult. However,
my hope is that this project has shown that there are many avenues to help alleviate the difficulty
of caregiving for our ill and elderly animal dependents. We can share concerns about how to
assess and accommodate the needs of our animals with our veterinarian, a hospice team, and
with our family. But as Held shows, true caring involves not just a caring disposition, but a
caring practice (cite). Committing to our animals throughout their lives—not just when they are
healthy but also when the going gets tough—is our moral obligation. It is what is required if we
are to be true companions to the animals we love.
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